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1. Introduction
Historically, the financial services industry in the United States was com-
prised of firms that operated, contentedly, in their respective areas of speciali-
zation: commercial banks only took demand deposits and made commercial
loans; the "thrift" industry (savings and loan associations and mutual savings
banks) emphasized savings deposits and home mortgages; insurance companies
conducted only an insurance business; and only investment banks and securi-
ties brokerage houses were engaged in securities-related activities. In fact, for
decades, the financial services industry effectively was compartmentalized by
the specialized legislation that governs various sectors of the industry. In
particular, the Banking Act of 1933, commonly known as the Glass-Steagall
Act (hereinafter the "Act"), segmented the industry by separating the business
of commercial and depository banking from the business of selling, dealing in,
and underwriting securities [1].
This compartmentalization of the financial services industry was effected by
regulatory schemes that offered special benefits, protections, and obligations to
each segment of the industry. However, during the 1970s, the impetus of
technological advances and a changed economic climate, characterized by
sustained high levels of inflation, prompted firms to venture out of their
respective traditional competitive arenas, both for the short term and in the
context of long-term restructuring of their businesses. Recently, the pace of
this change has quickened and has been accentuated by a number of well-pub-
licized expansion and diversification efforts. In particular, the intersection of
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commercial and investment banking activities has become so pronounced -
and exists in so many aspects of the financial services industry - that one
commentator was prompted to term the Glass-Steagall Act "the Maginot Line
of finance" [2].
In this context, some of the most striking - and complex - legal issues
presented by developments in the modern financial services industry arise in
connection with efforts of banking institutions to enter the securities field
through the development of new products and the acquisition of securities
firms and, conversely, with securities firms' development of new products and
acquisition of entities that engage in certain banking activities. This homogeni-
zation not only runs counter to much of the historical divergence between the
American banking system and the country's securities industry, not to mention
the basic precepts of the Glass-Steagall Act; it also implicates an array of
other statutes.
Faced with these developments, federal banking regulators generally have
not enforced a strict separation between banking and securities activities.
Rather, the banking agencies have tended to evaluate the permissibility of new
banking/securities activities on an ad hoc basis; an approach which has
permitted agencies to interpret statutes in light of the modern circumstances
presented and which frequently has led to the conclusion that novel activities
are permissible. This ad hoc approach, however, also has led to frequent
skirmishes between regulators and firms challenging particular regulatory
agency decisions.
This article reviews developments in the financial services industry and the
legal issues presented as the industry's statutory infrastructure - some of it
nearly a half-century old - is applied to novel and innovative financial
products and services.
2. Historical separation of commercial and investment banking
2.1. Formation of the U.S. banking system
The banking system in the United States evolved along lines similar to the
British system, with banks generally excluded from the conduct of a securities
business. Consistent with this fundamental separation, the National Banking
Act.of 1864 prohibited national banks from dealing in securities [3]. However,
the Comptroller of the Currency - the regulator of national banks chartered
under federal (rather than state) law - periodically took a permissive attitude
toward enforcing this ban, and, in a ruling issued early in the 1900s, national
banks expressly were permitted to deal in corporate debt securities. Banks then
sought to expand upon this authority and deal in corporate equity securities as
well. In this effort, national banks employed "securities affiliates", chartered
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under state law, to engage in the securities activities that national banks were
prohibited from conducting directly [4].
The stock market crash of 1929, and the ensuing Great Depression, led to
the failure of thousands of U.S. banks. In assessing blame for this disaster,
Congressional fingers were pointed at the activities of bank securities affiliates.
Congressional hearings, which revealed self-dealing and other unethical prac-
tices involving banks and their securities affiliates, lent support to these
charges [5].
In particular, hearings held by Senator Carter Glass revealed a range of
activities undertaken by bank securities affiliates which adversely affected the
safety and soundness of the parent banks. These abuses included:
* borrowing money from parent banks on concessionary terms;
* repurchase agreements between banks and affiliates designed to avoid
lending limits;
" trading upon the public identification between affiliates and parent banks;
" "dumping" of undesirable securities on parent banks by the affiliates;
* loans by parent banks to customers for the purpose of purchasing securities
offered for sale by affiliates;
" unsound shifting of assets between parent banks and the affiliates; and
" the assumption of questionable risks by affiliates that were impermissible
for the parent banks [6].
In an effort to prevent a repeat of these problems, and in order to prevent
the conflicts of interest that had given rise to such abuses, the Glass-Steagall
Act was enacted by Congress in 1933 to separate the business of dealing in and
underwriting securities from that of commercial and depository banking. Five
sections of the Glass-Steagall Act, in particular, were critical to this effort.
Three of these sections prohibit banks and securities firms from directly
crossing the barrier erected between the two industries. Thus, Section 16 of the
Act prohibits national banks from underwriting any issue of securities or
stock; it authorizes national banks to purchase and sell for their own account
only certain defined "investment securities", and to deal in, underwrite, and
purchase for their own account only U.S. government securities and state and
municipal general obligation bonds. Otherwise, Section 16 provides that "the
business of dealing in securities and stock by [banks] shall be limited to
purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon
the order and for the account of customers" [7]. Section 5 of the Act makes
these restrictions applicable to state-chartered banks which are members of the
Federal Reserve System [8]. And, Section 21 prohibits any organization which
receives deposits from concurrently engaging in the business of "issuing,
underwriting, selling, or distributing... stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or
other securities" [9]. State and non-member banks are, however, permitted to
conduct securities activities to the extent that such activities are permissible for
national banks pursuant to Section 16, and all banks are expressly permitted to
deal in real estate loans.
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In order to preclude indirect circumvention of these sweeping prohibitions,
Congress complemented these sections with two additional restrictions. Section
20 of the Act further prohibits national and state member banks from being
affiliated with any person or organization "engaged principally in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or
through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other
securities" [10]. Section 32 of the Act erects the final barrier between banking
and securities activities by prohibiting individuals from concurrently serving as
employees, officers, or directors of a national or member bank, and as
employees, officers, or directors of firms "primarily engaged in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution" of stocks, bonds, deben-
tures, notes, or other securities [11].
As will be seen, however, the Glass-Steagall Act's once formidable barrier
between banking and securities activities is today under heavy attack.
3. Legal issues presented by securities-related activities of banks
3.1. Investment funds
3.1.1. Bank common trust funds
3.1.1.1. Application of federal banking laws. The traditional type of bank
investment fund, the common trust fund had its genesis in Section 1 l(k) of the
Federal Reserve Act, which authorized national banks to act in the same
fiduciary capacities "in which State banks, trust companies or other corpora-
tions which come into competition with national banks are permitted to act
under the laws of the state in which the national bank is located" [12]. The
Federal Reserve Act granted the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (the "Board" or the "Federal Reserve Board") authority to issue
regulations governing the exercise of fiduciary powers by national banks.
Pursuant to this authority, the Board issued Regulation F, which permitted
national banks to exercise trust powers to the extent permitted to state banks
[13].
Subsequently, various states enacted legislation permitting their state banks
to establish common trust funds, and the Federal Reserve Board, relying on its
authority under Section 1 l(k) of the Federal Reserve Act, amended Regulation
F to permit the commingling of trust funds under certain conditions [14].
Common trust funds became increasingly popular thereafter, although this
trend temporarily was reversed in 1936, when the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a common trust fund administered
by the Brooklyn Trust Company was taxable as an association, thus denying
the fund a favorable flow-through tax treatment [15]. The Court's decision
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prompted the banking industry to press for amendments to the Internal
Revenue Code (the "Code"). A new provision to the Code was enacted to
grant tax exempt status to common trust funds maintained by a bank when the
trust funds are: (a) exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment
of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as trustee, executor,
administrator, or guardian; and (b) in conformity with the Board's rules and
regulations prevailing from time to time, pertaining to the collective investment
of trust funds held by national banks [16].
Thereafter, the Federal Reserve Board determined that collective investment
of funds would be permitted for funds held for "true fiduciary purposes" [17].
The Board's amended Regulation F sought to prevent common trust funds
from being marketed as investment vehicles, however, and made clear that
"the operation of such common trust funds as investment trusts for other than
strictly fiduciary purposes is hereby prohibited" [18]. This position was re-
iterated in 1940, when the Board declared that it was improper for a bank to
"operate a common trust fund as an investment trust attracting money, seeking
investment alone and to embark upon what would in effect be the sale of
participations in a common trust fund to the public as investments" [19]. The
Board further limited bank-sponsored common trust funds in 1945, when it
amended Regulation F to provide that banks "shall not advertise or publicize
the earnings realized on any common trust fund or the value of the assets
thereof' [20]. Furthermore, in 1953, the Board declared that it was not
permissible for a bank to invest in a common trust fund the assets of
individuals who are "not primarily concerned with the establishment of trusts
for true fiduciary purposes" [21].
In 1962, Congress transferred the responsibility for regulating the trust
activities of national banks from the Board to the Comptroller of the Currency
(the "Comptroller") [22]. Although the Comptroller liberalized the regulation
of bank funds in other respects, in defining permissible common trust fund
activities the Comptroller maintained restrictions on the promotion of the
funds by national banks. The Comptroller's regulations have continued to
prohibit advertising of common trust funds by banks, and permit the distribu-
tion of the funds' financial reports only upon request or to prospective trust
customers [23].
3.1.1.2. Application of federal securities laws. Common trust funds may be
subject to registration as investment companies under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 (the "ICA") [24] and interests in such funds may be required
to be registered as securities under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act") [25], since the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC") has taken the position that common and collective investment funds
maintained by a bank are entities separate and distinct from the sponsoring
bank, and thus cannot rely on federal securities laws exemptions available to
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banks [26]. Common trust funds may be exempt from registration, however, if
they qualify under the exemptions particularly applicable to such funds, i.e.
Section 3(c) (2) of the Securities Act [27] and Section 3(c) (3) of the Investment
Company Act [28].
The SEC has attempted to harmonize its approach to the bank common
trust fund exemptions under the securities laws with the concept of a common
trust fund reflected in the rules of the Federal Reserve Board and the
Comptroller of the Currency. Thus, according to former SEC Chairman Cary,
the SEC has applied the securities law trust fund exemptions "in a manner
consistent with the Federal Reserve Board's concept about the proper scope of
activities of a bank common trust fund" [29].
For example, the SEC has consistently taken the position that exemptions
do not cover funds used or promoted as "vehicles for general investment by
the public" [30]. Furthermore, for the exemptions to apply, customers' accounts
must be created for "true fiduciary purposes" [31]. Generally, such purposes
pertain to estate planning and non-investment oriented trust services and
fiduciary functions [32]. Moreover, the bank must act in a traditional fiduciary
capacity with respect to its customers' accounts [33].
3.1.2. Collective investment funds
3.1.2.1. Application of federal banking laws. The growth of tax qualified
corporate-sponsored employee retirement plans during the 1950s prompted the
Federal Reserve Board to revise Regulation F to permit banks to establish
another type of investment fund; a collective fund for corporate-sponsored
employee retirement plans [34]. The Board did not extend to these funds the
same restrictions on advertising it had applied to common trust funds in order
to prevent the latter from being used as investment vehicles, however.
In 1962, Congress transferred supervisory authority over the trust powers of
national banks from the Federal Reserve Board to the Comptroller of the
Currency [35], and the Comptroller instituted major changes in the regulation
of collective investment media. The Comptroller's new Regulation 9 eliminated
the requirement of a "true fiduciary purpose" for accounts participating in
common trust funds [36]. Regulation 9 also authorized banks collectively to
invest and manage monies delivered separately to the bank for investment
management, rather than for fiduciary purposes.
However, a version of this type of fund was held to be a violation of the
Glass-Steagall Act by the Supreme Court in Investment Company Institute v.
Camp [37]. The Supreme Court concluded that, while a bank could either
commingle bona fide trust funds for convenience or act as a managing agent
for separate accounts, the union of both these powers gave birth to an
investment fund virtually indistinguishable from a mutual fund - a fund
prohibited to banks by the Glass-Steagall Act since it placed a bank in the
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position of issuing, underwriting, selling and distributing "securities" within
the meaning of the Act.
From the time of this decision, the Comptroller's collective investment fund
regulations have permitted banks collectively to invest assets: (a) in a common
trust fund maintained by the bank exclusively for the collective investment and
reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as
trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, or custodian under a uniform gifts
to minors act [38], or (b) in a fund consisting solely of the assets of retirement,
pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, or other trusts which are exempt from
federal income taxation under the Internal Revenue Code [39].
3.1.2.2. Application of the Federal Securities Laws. Prior to the amendment of
the Investment Company Act in 1970, the SEC staff administratively had
taken "no-action" positions that collective investment funds for corporate-
sponsored employee benefit plans were exempt from the requirements of the
ICA and that interests in such funds were exempt from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act. This position was based, in part, on the fact
that the Comptroller prohibited banks from advertising and publicizing pooled
investment funds for corporate sponsors of the plans and that such funds were
offered to a small universe of relatively sophisticated corporate-sponsored
retirement plan managers. The SEC staff had also taken "no-action" positions
that pooled funds for so-called Keogh plans (retirement plans for self-em-
ployed individuals) were exempt from the ICA. However, the SEC did not
treat interests in pooled funds for Keogh plans as exempt under the Securities
Act [40].
The Investment Company Act Amendments of 1970 codified the SEC
staff's "no action" position regarding the exemption of both pooled funds for
corporate-sponsored and Keogh plans, by exempting such funds from the
definition of an investment company in Section 3(c) (11) of the Investment
Company Act [41]. Also, Section 3(a) (2) (seventh clause) was added to the
Securities Act, incorporating the SEC's traditional "no-action" practice of
exempting interests in corporate-sponsored pooled funds (but not Keogh
funds) from the registration requirements of the Securities Act [421.
The SEC staff has taken a very literal approach to the exemption provided
in Section 3(a) (2) of the Securities Act for corporate-sponsored employee
retirement plans, which exempts plans qualified under Section 401 of the Code,
maintained by a bank. Not only is the exemption inapplicable to interests in
pooled funds for Keogh plans [43], but the exemption also does not apply to
pooled funds containing assets of Industrial Retirement Accounts ("IRAs")
[441, because IRAs are qualified under Section 408, not Section 401, of the
Internal Revenue Code. However, many banks rely on the "intrastate offering"
exemption of Section 3(a) (1I) of the Securities Act to maintain pooled Keogh
funds without registering under the Securities Act [45]. Similarly, the ICA
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exemption for pooled funds is available for funds consisting solely of assets of
plans that are tax exempt under Section 401 of the Code [46].
3.1.3. Collective investment funds for individual retirement accounts
Recently, the Comptroller of the Currency approved a plan by Citibank,
N.A., to invest IRA assets in a common investment fund created by Citibank,
a development which, if upheld by the courts, could presage a substantial
expansion of the use of bank-sponsored funds as investment vehicles [47].
Normally, Citibank would be required to comply with the Comptroller's
regulations which restrict marketing and promotion of common and collective
funds. Citibank, however, informed the Comptroller that it was required to
register the fund with the SEC as an investment company under the ICA, and
interests in the fund as securities under the Securities Act, and the Comptroller
granted Citibank extensive exemptions from the Comptroller's rules that
conflicted with those federal securities laws [48]. Thus, interests in the Citibank
fund may be marketed to the IRA investing public on the same scale as any
other type of security.
In approving Citibank's request for exemptions from the Comptroller's
rules, the Comptroller declined to apply the Glass-Steagall Act to block
Citibank's fund even though the fund entailed creation of an investment
company and resulted in the issuance of securities of that investment company.
The Comptroller's opinion attempted to distinguish the current Citibank fund
from the Citibank collective fund held to be impermissible by the Supreme
Court in Investment Company Institute v. Camp [49], and asserted that Camp
actually was supportive of the Comptroller's conclusion that the prohibitions
of the Glass-Steagall Act did not apply to the collective investment of IRA
trust assets in the manner proposed by Citibank. The Comptroller's decision
characterized the Camp decision as recognizing that banks traditionally have
commingled trust assets, and relied upon the distinction between funds com-
mingled in a trust capacity and the commingled agency account at issue in
Camp. Specifically, the Comptroller's opinion focused on language in the
Camp decision where the Supreme Court noted that "[f]or at least a
generation... there has been no reason to doubt that a national bank can,
consistently with the banking laws, commingle trust funds" [50].
The Comptroller also noted that, while the IRA trusts (and participations in
the fund) would be offered as "securities" and registered pursuant to the
Securities Act, the Comptroller had never viewed the meaning of the term
"securities" under the securities laws as necessarily synonymous with its
meaning under the Glass-Steagall Act. In particular, the Comptroller con-
cluded that the IRA investments being offered by Citibank were more akin to
a fiduciary service than a security and did not present the hazards and
potential abuses which Congress sought to avoid when it enacted the
Glass-Steagall Act. Therefore, the Comptroller reasoned, -it was inappropriate
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to regard participations in the new Citibank fund as "securities" for
Glass-Steagall Act purposes since the "securities" "merely represent[ed] the
formal manifestation of a traditional banking service" [50a].
However, irrespective of the Comptroller's conclusion that the Citibank
fund faced no Glass-Steagall Act impediment, the fund does present some
meaningful Glass-Steagall Act issues which are likely to be carefully scrutinized
and have engendered opposition from the securities industry [50b]. For exam-
ple, while the Supreme Court's decision in Camp did allow that there had been
no reason to doubt that a national bank could commingle trust funds, the
Court was apparently referring to the "traditional" role of banks as trustee for
pre-existing trusts which were commingled for ease of management - not to a
situation where banks marketed an investment vehicle which, incidentally,
involved a trust relationship.
Moreover, although the fund at issue in Camp involved Citibank acting as
managing agent rather than trustee, even so, Citibank acted in a fiduciary
capacity materially indistinguishable from its status with respect to its IRA
fund. The Camp decision also specifically made reference to the fact that the
fund at issue was an investment company under the Investment Company Act
- as is the new Citibank fund - and emphatically rejected a narrow reading of
the term "securities" for Glass-Steagall Act purposes. Also, the Federal
Reserve Board, in applying and interpreting Section 32 of the Glass-Steagall
Act, has viewed the operation of a registered open-end investment company as
an activity forbidden to banks. Indeed, in response to a recent request for
information concerning the status under Section 32 of certain personnel
interlocks between Citibank and its new fund, the Board reiterated its long-
standing view that "an officer, director, or employee of a member bank of the
Federal Reserve System may not serve in an interlocking relationship with an
open-end investment company" [51]. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the
new Citibank fund for IRA trust assets will withstand a challenge under the
Glass-Steagall Act
3.1.4. Investment companies sponsored by bank subsidiaries
The Supreme Court's decision in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System v. Investment Company Institute [52], which upheld regulations issued
by the Board permitting bank holding companies and their non-bank affiliates
to serve as investment advisers to closed-end investment companies, has
encouraged some banking institutions to employ subsidiary corporations as a
structural device to attempt to avoid the application of the Glass-Steagall Act.
In footnote 24 of that opinion, the Court analyzed Section 21 of the Glass-
Steagall Act:
Section 21 prohibits firms engaged in the securities business from also receiving deposits. Bank
holding companies do not receive deposits and the language of Section 21 cannot be read to
include within its prohibition separate organizations related to ownership with a bank, which does
receive deposits [531.
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One interpretation of the Court's language is that Section 21 of the
Glass-Steagall Act only prohibits the combination of banking and securities
activities when both are conducted by a single legal entity. The implications of
this reading of Section 21 are formidable, since the section is the only section
of the Glass-Steagall Act which, by its literal terms, applies to all types of
depository institutions.
Whether the Supreme Court actually intended the Board of Governors
decision to endorse a conclusion that the Glass-Steagall Act could be avoided
by the expedient of acquiring or creating wholly-owned securities subsidiaries
is open to debate. For example, the discussion in footnote 24 was in the
context of the Court's conclusion that a bank subject to Section 21 would not
be prohibited from engaging in the investment advisory activities the Federal
Reserve Board sought to authorize for bank holding companies. Thus, the
decision did not explicitly sanction the use of an affiliate to conduct an activity
that a bank itself was prohibited from conducting directly. Moreover, in Board
of Governors, the subsidiary's activities were required to be "closely related to
banking" under Bank Holding Company Act standards. No such "closely
related" limitation applies, however, with respect to a subsidiary of a bank not
within a holding company complex. This fact also may limit the holding of
Board of Governors.
Even if Section 21 were interpreted to apply only where securities and
depository activities are conducted by a single legal entity, it does not neces-
sarily follow that bank securities activities conducted through subsidiaries
would not be subject to Section 21. Particular circumstances may indicate that
a subsidiary is an alter ego of its parent bank, employed by the bank for the
purpose of avoiding the application of the Glass-Steagall Act to the bank. In
such a case, the subsidiary's corporate form would be disregarded and the acts
of the subsidiary would be treated as the acts of the controlling bank [54].
At least two state chartered non-member banks, however, have relied upon
footnote 24 in the Board of Governors case to attempt to conduct an investment
company business through subsidiaries. The Boston Five Cents Savings Bank
established The Boston Five Fund Distributor (renamed The School Street
Fund Distributor), and The Boston Five Fund Adviser (renamed The School
Street Fund Adviser), respectively, to underwrite and distribute, and advise a
newly created mutual fund, The Boston Five Mutual Fund (renamed The
School Street Mutual Fund). Another non-member bank, the Washington
Mutual Savings Bank, has also acquired an existing brokerage firm and an
investment adviser to a family of mutual funds [551, and Guaranty Savings and
Loan Association has attempted to start two mutual funds [55a].
Prompted by objections raised to The Boston Five Cents Bank's proposed
securities activities, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC")
issued a "Statement of Policy on the Applicability of the Glass-Steagall Act to
Securities Activities of Subsidiaries of Insured Non-Member Banks" [561. The
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FDIC's Policy Statement relied upon footnote 24 in the Board of Governors
case to conclude that the Glass-Steagall Act "does not reach the securities
activities of a bona fide subsidiary of an insured non-member bank", thus,
apparently recognizing the relevance of alter ego concepts to the application of
Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. However, the FDIC permitted the
proposed activities of the Boston Five Cents Savings Bank to proceed and
declined to address assertions made by securities industry groups that the
bank's securities activities would violate the Glass-Steagall Act [57].
3.1.4.1. Application of federal securities laws. The exemptions from the federal
securities laws applicable to "banks" do not apply to subsidiaries or affiliates
of banks; thus, an investment company sponsored by a bank subsidiary is fully
subject to the ICA, the shares of the fund are subject to registration under the
Securities Act, and investment adviser and distributor affiliates of the bank are
subject, respectively, to the Investment Advisers Act and the broker- dealer
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act (the "Exchange Act").
Recently, the SEC has grappled with the ramifications of the treatment
under the securities laws of bank efforts to create and operate investment
companies through bank subsidiaries. The catalyst for this examination was
the case of the mutual fund created, and to be operated and advised by, Boston
Five Cents Savings Bank subsidiaries.
The Boston Five Mutual Fund applied to the SEC to accelerate the
effectiveness of its registration statement under the ICA and the Securities Act.
Under Section 8(a) of the Securities Act, however, the SEC may take such
action only after considering several specified factors, including the public
interest [58]. In this context, the SEC observed that "the legality under the
Glass-Steagall Act and other banking laws of this proposed relationship
between a banking institution and an investment company is unclear" [59], and
indicated that it was therefore unable to make the requisite finding that it
would be in the public interest to permit the fund to begin operation.
Recognizing the "novel and innovative relationships between banks and
investment companies [were] becoming more common" and that the SEC
would likely be faced with other similar situations, the SEC sought the
"opinion of the FDIC as to whether operation of the fund in the proposed
manner would be lawful under the Glass-Steagall Act and other laws with
respect to which the FDIC has jurisdiction" [60]. The SEC also indicated that,
in the future, it would seek the opinion of the relevant federal banking agency
in situations where banks proposed to engage in securities activities that raise
issues under the Glass-Steagall Act and other banking laws [61]. However, the
FDIC declined to give a specific response to the SEC's inquiry and referred the
SEC to the FDIC's policy statement. The SEC ultimately found the FDIC's
implicit clearance of The Boston Five Cents Savings Bank's securities activities
to be sufficient, and permitted acceleration of the effectiveness of the registra-
tion statement of the bank's fund.
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Subsequently, the SEC determined that it would not refuse to accelerate the
effectiveness of registration statements for funds involving banks where a bank
was acting merely as a medium to distribute shares of the fund, i.e. checking
account "sweeps" [62]. In these situations the SEC indicated that it would
require full disclosure of Glass-Steagall Act issues in the fund's registration
statement. But, where a fund was created, managed, and operated, directly or
indirectly, by a bank or depository institution, the SEC concluded that it
would not grant requests for accelerated treatment until it received an indica-
tion of the legality of the proposed fund from the relevant federal banking
agency [63].
3.1.4.2. Applying the Investment Company Act to investment companies created
and operated by bank subsidiaries. Because the ICA was adopted after the
Glass-Steagall Act had presumably separated commercial and depository
banking from investment banking activities, the ICA does not contemplate
bank involvement in the creation and operation of investment companies. The
ICA thus may create impediments to certain structures established by banks to
operate investment companies.
For example, Section 17(a) of the ICA restricts purchases of securities or
other property from, and sales of securities or other property to, an investment
company by an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter, or
affiliated person of any such person [64]. Thus, where an investment company
is sponsored by a banking institution or bank affiliate, the sale by the bank of
its certificates of deposit to its affiliated investment company would be
prohibited under Section 17(a) of the ICA, unless the SEC, upon application,
issued an order pursuant to Section 17(b) of the ICA permitting the transac-
tion. Alternatively, the SEC could, by rule, regulation, or order, exempt the
transaction from Section 17(a) if it found that the exemption was necessary or
appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of
investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of the
ICA [65].
Section 12(d) (3) of the ICA also prohibits a registered investment company
from purchasing or otherwise acquiring any security issued by, among others,
any person who is a broker, a dealer engaged in the business of underwriting,
or either an investment adviser of an investment company or an investment
adviser registered under the Investment Advisers Act [66]. This section may
prohibit an investment company from acquiring securities, including certifi-
cates of deposit, of a bank which was the investment adviser to the investment
company.
Section 17(d) of the ICA restricts joint transactions between an investment
company and certain related entities, prohibiting an affiliated person or
underwriter of an investment company or an affiliated person of any such
person, from effecting any transaction in which the investment company is a
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joint or a joint and several participant with such affiliated person, underwriter,
or affiliated person of an affiliated person or underwriter [671. Thus, Section
17(d) could prohibit a bank from bolstering a company to which it had made a
loan by causing an affiliated investment company, to buy stocks, bonds, or
other securities issued by that company [68].
Also, Section 35(d) of the ICA provides that it is unlawful for a registered
investment company to adopt, as part of its name or title, any word or words
that are deceptive or misleading. Where an investment company, sponsored by
a bank affiliate, uses the bank's name, such use might violate Section 35(d)
because it misleadingly connotes that investments in the investment company
are as secure as insured deposits in the bank [69].
3.1.4.3. Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 and interest rate ceil-
ings. The ability of banks to conduct securities activities through subsidiaries
may also be influenced and restricted by federal banking laws such as the
Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 (the "DIDA") [70]. The
DIDA is designed to provide an orderly phase-out, and ultimate elimination,
of ceilings on rates of interest payable on deposits and accounts by federally
regulated depository institutions, but continues in force certain interest rate
restrictions established by federal banking agencies [71]. Thus, where a bank
employs a subsidiary to establish and operate an investment company, the
bank may create a means for the transfer of funds from the bank's interest-
rate-regulated accounts to that investment company, and the structure may be
deemed a means to offer a higher rate of return than permissible under the
DIDA and applicable federal regulations.
However, the recently enacted Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982 [72] should substantially reduce the temptation for depository
institutions to create structures to avoid the application of interest rate ceilings.
That Act authorizes depository institutions to offer a new "money market
deposit account" which is not subject to a limitation on the rate of interest
payable on the account [73]. Moreover, the Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion Committee (the "DIDC") has also authorized another account, termed a
"Super NOW" account, which also pays a market rate of interest and which, in
addition, offers unlimited checking features [74]. ("NOW" is an abbreviation
of "negotiable order of withdrawal".) Thus, depository institutions are now
more able to compete with securities industry products by offering deposits
that pay a market rate of return.
3.1.4.4. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act. The Financial Institutions Su-
pervisory Act (the "FISA") grants to the respective federal banking agencies
the power to take action against banks and depository institutions which have
engaged, are engaged, or are about to engage in an "unsafe or unsound
[banking] practice" [75]. An activity need not violate federal or state laws or
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regulations to constitute an unsafe and unsound banking practice. The activity
also need not be intrinsically improper, unsafe, or unsound. The test is
whether, under the circumstances, the activity poses a danger to the financial
soundness and integrity of the bank, portends a loss of public confidence in
the bank's soundness and integrity, or presents a conflict of interest which
might endanger independent and disinterested banking judgment [76].
In this context, as banks begin to engage in securities activities, the
legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act is relevant since it indicates a
Congressional concern that bank involvement in securities activities would
create unique conflicts of interest which would risk unsafe and unsound
banking practices. During the course of the FDIC's consideration of its
"Statement of Policy on the Applicability of the Glass-Steagall Act to
Securities Activities of Subsidiaries of Insured Non-Member Banks", for
example, the Chairman of the FDIC indicated that concerns for safe and
sound banking practices would need to be addressed if banks were to be
permitted to engage in securities activities. Shortly thereafter, the FDIC
requested public comments on the safeguards, if any, that the FDIC should
apply to banks that proposed to engage in securities activities [77].
3.1.4.5. Federal Trade Commission Act. Section 18 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (the "FTC Act") [78], grants the federal banking agencies the
authority to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" by banks and to
take appropriate action under the FISA against any bank subject to a given
agency's jurisdiction which engages in such practices. Regulations promulgated
by the Federal Reserve Board provide that an act or practice that is "not
prohibited by current federal or state laws or regulations" may nevertheless
constitute an unfair and deceptive practice [79]. Thus, the FTC Act contains
yet another standard against which bank securities activities may be judged.
3.1.4.6. Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Pursuant to its authority under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the FDIC has promulgated regulations pro-
hibiting insured banks from "causing or permitting any change to be made in
the general character or type of business exercised by [them] without the prior
written consent of the [FDIC]" [80].
The purpose of the FDIC's regulation is to guarantee that insured banks do
not make significant changes in the business they conduct and become engaged
in activities which could adversely affect the security of the bank's deposits and
the ultimate exposure of the FDIC [81]. Thus, because involvement in securi-
ties activities is, at least, in unconventional bank activity, the creation and
operation of an investment company by a bank might require prior FDIC
approval.
3.1.5. Investment funds linked to banks
"Private label" funds, group sponsored funds, checking account "sweep"
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arrangements, and other non-traditional arrangements between banks and
third parties to provide securities products to bank customers have also
presented novel questions concerning the extent to which the provision of these
products by banks is subject to challenge under the Glass-Steagall Act or
other federal statutes.
(1) Checking account "sweeps" are arrangements whereby shares of a
mutual fund (usually a money market mutual fund) are automatically purchased
with funds from a customer's bank account that exceed a predetermined
threshold. These shares are then automatically redeemed if the balance of the
customer's bank account falls below another predetermined amount. To ac-
complish these "sweeps", the customer designates the bank as his agent for the
purchase and sale of the fund shares [82].
(2) "Private label" funds or proprietary funds come in many varieties, but
generally are money market funds, established by an unrelated third party at
the behest of and pursuant to arrangements with a bank. These funds are
linked to accounts at that bank via a "sweep" arrangement and are available
solely to the bank's customers - hence the "private label" terminology [83]. In
many cases, the sponsoring bank or a subsidiary will serve as a co-adviser to
the sponsor of the fund. For this service, the bank generally receives a fee
based upon a percentage of the net asset value of the fund. The bank may also
be compensated for serving as custodian or transfer agent for the fund.
(3) Group sponsored funds, are another type of bank-linked investment
product. A group fund is sponsored not by a single bank but by an entity, the
members of which are banks. Group funds generally operate in the same
manner as "private label" funds, linking a customer's checking or NOW
account at a group member bank to the fund by a "sweep" arrangement [84].
Group funds may also offer customers combinations of other financial prod-
ucts and services in conjunction with bank accounts.
3.1.5.1. Glass-Steagall Act implications. For Glass-Steagall Act purposes, the
status of a bank or other depository institution in a sweep will vary depending
upon the extent to which the bank is involved in promoting and servicing the
fund used in the sweep. Generally, the greater the bank's involvement in
providing services in connection with the sweep arrangement, the closer is the
Glass-Steagall Act question presented.
For example, a bank may perform a number of functions in a sweep
arrangement. The bank or an affiliate may be custodian, subcustodian, transfer
agent, adviser, co-adviser, subadviser, administrator, or subadministrator of
the fund. The fund may be a "private label" fund, or a group fund, available
only to customers of a particular bank or banks. A sweep arrangement may
also be provided as part of a financial services package, including the sweep, a
checking or NOW account, brokerage account (perhaps with a margin feature),
and a debit card.
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The legality under the Glass-Steagall Act of sweep programs where the
bank does not provide services to the fund in connection with the sweep,
hinges upon whether the bank's activity constitutes "purchasing and selling
securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order and for the
account of customers" as permitted by Section 16 of the Act. The scope of this
exception from the Glass-Steagall Act's prohibitions was discussed in detail by
the district court in New York Stock Exchange v. Smith [85], in connection with
the provision of an automatic investment service (the "AIS") by a bank, which
the court ultimately found to be permissible under the Glass-Steagall Act.
Sweep arrangements bear a strong resemblance to the AIS addressed in New
York Stock Exchange v. Smith. However, the characteristics of the AIS the
district court found significant in its decision may not be present in all types of
sweeps. For example, the court in New York Stock Exchange v. Smith stressed
that AIS banks only provide a service, and are not under pressure to increase a
fund's profit (or sales) from which the bank's compensation would be derived.
Also, in the AIS program the bank was not offering any investment advice,
directly or indirectly, concerning the securities purchased through AIS.
Where a bank plays a number of roles in a sweep arrangement, however, the
bank's additional involvement presents the question of whether the bank's
conduct has crossed over into underwriting and distribution of securities
prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act. Examples of extensive involvement
include situations in which (i) funds are transferred from bank customers'
accounts into a single "private label" fund - arguably, if the bank were truly
acting only as an agent, it could choose from a variety of available invest-
ments; (ii) a bank performs extensive services for the fund; or (iii) the bank
markets the fund to bank customers in a manner implying that the bank is
sponsoring the fund [86].
3.1.5.2. Application of the federal securities laws. Bank-linked investment
funds also raise novel questions under the federal securities laws. For example,
when the VISA Money Market Fund first applied to the SEC to register as an
investment company under the ICA and to register its shares for sale to the
public under the Securities Act, the SEC staff declined to accelerate the fund's
effectiveness. In large measure, the effective date was not accelerated because
the fund's objective of benefiting VISA-participant banks was regarded as
fundamentally inconsistent with the statutorily established objectives of invest-
ment companies under the ICA - to further the interests of fund investors
above all. The SEC staff reportedly commented that "for any fund to agree to
be set up where the linchpin of its objectives is not maximization of investors'
profit but investing in the certificates of deposit ("CDs") of the sponsoring
group is something that does not fit quite right" [87]. The VISA Money Market
Fund also was alleged to present a variety of other issues under the Investment
Company Act and several banking statutes [881.
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The effort of the VISA fund to obtain registration under the ICA pointed
up several respects in which bank-linked funds may involve activities that run
counter to the policies of the ICA, and prompted the SEC to hold hearings to
further examine these issues [89]. For example, where a fund has an investment
policy that relates the purchase of securities issued by financial institutions
(e.g. bank certificates of deposit) to the volume of sales of fund shares to
customers of those institutions (a "sales-related investment policy"), have
persons with fiduciary duties with respect to the fund under Section 36(a) of
the ICA properly discharged their fiduciary duties to act only in the best
interests of the fund [90]? Does a sales-related investment policy constitute
participation in a joint enterprise or joint arrangement between the fund and
its affiliated persons, principal underwriter, or affiliated persons thereof,
prohibited under Section 17(d) of the ICA? If a financial institution provides
to its customers shares of a fund that follows a sales-related investment policy,
is that institution an underwriter of those shares for the purposes of Section
2(a) (4) of the ICA [91]? If so, then would Section 12(d) (3) of the ICA, which
prohibits an investment company from purchasing a security issued by, or
other interest in, the business of a person engaged in the business of underwrit-
ing, bar the fund from buying certificates of deposit from its participating
banks [92]?
The involvement of banks in "sweep" arrangements also raises novel
disclosure questions. For example, Rule 12b-1 under the ICA permits an
investment company to finance the distribution of its own securities [93].
Under this provision, banks that sweep customers' accounts or provide other
services to facilitate the distribution of the fund's shares may be compensated
for their services. But a fund paying a bank for those services must also fully
disclose that fact and otherwise comply with Rule 12b-1. Disclosure is required
of the purposes for which the payments are made and of the services actually
provided. This, in turn, highlights the question of whether the bank's services
actually involve distributing the fund's shares, and may impliedly characterize
the bank's activity as one prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act.
3.2. Underwriting and securities placement
3.2.1. Permissible underwriting by banks
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act permits national banks (and by
reference state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System) to
underwrite "obligations of the United States or general obligations of any state
or of any political subdivision thereof" and the securities of certain U.S.
government agencies and specified state and local revenue bonds [94]. Revenue
bonds qualifying to be underwritten by banks must be backed by the general
taxing power of a state or municipality [95].
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3.2.2. Underwriting by bank holding company affiliates
On a case-by-case basis, the Federal Reserve Board has approved applica-
tions under Section 4(c) (8) of the Bank Holding Company Act [95a] to permit
bank holding companies to engage in dealing (1) in obligations of the United
States, (2) in general obligations of states and their political subdivisions, and
(3) in other obligations that state-member banks are authorized to underwrite
and deal in, pursuant to Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act [96].
3.2.3. Private placements
In general, private placement activities, i.e. sales of securities not constitut-
ing a public offering, conducted by banks, include making recommendations
regarding the terms and timing of a transaction, assisting in the preparation of
a financing memorandum describing the terms of the placement, contacting
institutional investors for signs of interest in the proposal, gathering together
the investors' comments for the prospective issuer, arranging meetings between
the customer and potential investors, and assisting in subsequent negotiations
[97].
In the 1970s, the Comptroller of the Currency issued several letters indi-
cating that banks could be viewed as engaged in underwriting prohibited by
the Glass-Steagall Act when they participated in negotiating the terms of a
private placement and were compensated on a contingent basis [98]. In fact, in
1977, the Federal Reserve Board denied an application by a prospective bank
holding company to retain an interest in a company which was registered as a
broker-dealer and was engaged in the business of assisting business enterprises
in private placements of debt and equity securities [99]. The Board later issued
a clarifying letter, however, which stated that its earlier order was not intended
to determine the legality under the Glass-Steagall Act of private placement
activities, but only to prevent such activities from being conducted under the
Bank Holding Company Act by non-bank subsidiaries of bank holding compa-
nies.
In June 1977, the staff of the Federal Reserve Board issued a Private
Placement Study, (the "Study") which concluded that, "while the answers are
not completely free from doubt, the stronger case would support a conclusion
that private placement activities are not prohibited either by [Sections 16 or 21]
of the Glass-Steagall Act" [100]. The Study rejected the earlier positions
expressed by the Comptroller and the Board itself, stating that those positions
had not properly taken into account the definition of "underwriting" con-
tained in the Securities Act for the purposes of defining the term under the
Glass-Steagall Act. Relying upon the definition of the term "underwriting"
used in the Securities Act, the Study asserted that banks were not engaged in
underwriting in violation of the Glass-Steagall Act because banks were not
acting as "firm commitment" underwriters (i.e. not purchasing securities for
resale to third parties) [101].
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The Study conceded that bank involvement in private placements on a
contingent free basis could constitute "best efforts" underwriting. But, the
Study reasoned, that even if the bank's involvement were deemed to be "best
efforts underwriting", the activity was not necessarily forbidden under the
Glass-Steagall Act because the Securities Act definition of the term "un-
derwriter" applies only to persons involved in public, as opposed to private,
offerings of securities. The Study argued that neither "best efforts" nor "firm
commitment" underwriters who perform only private placements are consid-
ered underwriters for the purposes of the Securities Act [102]. The Study also
indicated that investors purchasing bank private placements are virtually
always large institutional investors [1031.
Shortly after the issuance of the Study, the Comptroller of the Currency
indicated his concurrence in the view that the "Glass-Steagall Act does not
prohibit private placement activity as presently conducted by commercial
banks" [104]. More recently, the Comptroller again followed the approach of
looking to the Securities Act for the definition of a term used in the
Glass-Steagall Act. In an interpretive letter, the Comptroller took the position
that a private placement by a bank that would not involve a "distribution" as
that term is used in the Securities Act was not prohibited under the
Glass-Steagall Act [105].
3.2.4. Commercial paper activities
In 1978, Bankers Trust Company, a state-chartered member bank of the
Federal Reserve System, began offering third-party commercial paper for sale
- that is, commercial paper issued by industrial corporations. Bankers Trust's
effort to begin marketing third-party commercial paper included a marketing
campaign aimed at issuers of the paper whereby Bankers Trust agreed to act as
the seller of the commercial paper and emphasized its ability to perform
services competitive with other securities dealers. As part of the advertising,
Bankers Trust also offered to lend the issuer of commercial paper money equal
to the amount of paper to be sold. Then, if Bankers Trust were unable to sell
all of the issuer's paper, the bank would take back notes reflecting the amount
of unsold paper. In practical effect, these transactions resembled underwriting
the sale of the commercial paper. However, Federal Reserve Board took the
position that the commercial paper activities of Bankers Trust were not
precluded by the Glass-Steagall Act because commercial paper is not a
"security" for the purposes of that Act.
In support of this position, the Board had to confront the fact that
commercial paper is deemed to be a security for purposes of the Securities Act.
The Board argued that the meaning of the term "security" as used in the
Securities Act of 1933 was not relevant to illuminate the meaning of the same
term as used in the Glass-Steagall Act. The Board thus declined to follow its
staff's reliance on Securities Act definitions in the Private Placement Study -
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where reference to of Securities Act definitions had assisted the staff in
reaching the conclusion that bank private placement activities were not "un-
derwriting" prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act.
The Board's conclusion that commercial paper was not a "security" for
Glass-Steagall Act purposes was challenged by the securities industry [106].
The first court to consider the case agreed with the challengers and held that
commercial paper was a security within the meaning of the Act [107]. This
district court decision subsequently was reversed, however, by the court of
appeals, which held that the purpose, language, and legislative history of the
Glass-Steagall Act supported the Board's original conclusion that commercial
paper was not a Glass-Steagall Act "security" [108].
However, the court of appeals' decision may be even more meaningful for
the manner in which the court reached its result - according substantial
deference to the determination of the Federal Reserve Board. The court of
appeals, in effect, expressly endorsed the Board's effort to modernize the
application of the Glass-Steagall Act through "interpretation", and thus the
court's decision may encourage similar, ad hoc modernization efforts by the
Board and other federal banking agencies - which, in turn, is likely to
engender a variety of lawsuits against those agencies. Review of the decision of
the court of appeals has been sought.
3.3. Marketing of debt instruments
3.3.1. "Retail repos"
3.3.1.1. Nature of a "retail repo". Retail repurchase agreements, so-called
"retail repos", are financial instruments - not subject to interest rate ceilings -
developed by banks and savings and loan associations to compete with the
market rates of interest provided by investments offered by the securities
industry. Retail repos are, in effect, debt obligations of banks and savings and
loan associations ("S&Ls") that are collateralized by an interest in a security
or a pool of securities that are direct obligations of, or are guaranteed by, the
United States or a U.S. government agency. Retail repos are issued in
denominations of less than $100,000, with maturities of less than 90 days [109].
Although retail repos typically are marketed as a "sale" of a U.S. government
security or sale of a share in such a security, the purchaser of a retail repo
actually acquires only a limited interest in the underlying security. For exam-
ple, the investment return on a retail repo theoretically is independent of
variations in the market value of or the interest paid on the underlying
securities. In reality, what is "sold" is a bank's or S&L's obligation to pay a
predetermined amount secured by an interest in underlying government instru-
ments.
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3.3.1.2. Application of the federal securities laws to retail repos. In September
1981 the Securities and Exchange Commission issued an interpretive release,
together with two staff "no-action" letters, addressing the general status of
retail repos under the federal securities laws [110]. The no-action letters
concluded that the retail repos sold by a bank or an S&L would be treated as
securities of the bank or S&L, rather than participations in the underlying
government security, and were therefore exempt from registration under Sec-
tions 3(a)(2) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Act [111].
The SEC staff relied upon the following factors in reaching its conclusion:
(1) purchasers look to the bank or S&L for payment of the principal and
interest due them; (2) purchasers obtain no economic characteristics of owner-
ship of the underlying government security, including no risk of loss or
opportunity of gain from capital value fluctuations of the underlying security;
(3) the "resale" price to be paid by the bank or S&L represents a return on the
purchaser's initial purchase price, plus interest; (4) the interest to be paid by
the bank or S&L is not limited to or dependent upon the interest rate earned
by the underlying government security; and (5) the maturity of the government
security is not coterminous - except coincidentally - with the maturity of the
retail repo agreement. The SEC staff also indicated that the repos would be
exempt from the indenture qualification requirements of the Trust Indenture
Act pursuant to Section 304(a) (4) (A) [112], and that the bank or S&L was
not required to register with the SEC as a broker-dealer under the Securities
Exchange Act.
The staff also indicated that the pool of government securities collateraliz-
ing the retail repos would not be considered an investment company separate
from the b~nk or S&L, unless other factors were present, such as holding out
the retail repo arrangement as the conveyance of an interest in a government
security 6r pool of government securities. Had the staff concluded that an
investment company existed, the bank or S&L would be distributing securities
(investment company participations) in violation of the Glass-Steagall Act
[1131.
The SEC's Release stressed that the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws apply to transactions involving retail repos, and urged that
"[B]anks and savings and loan associations proposing to offer retail repos...
take steps to assure that all documents used in connection with retail repo
programs are accurate and contain no material misstatements or omit to state
facts necessary in order to make the statements made not misleading" [114].
The SEC recently reaffirmed these concerns by publishing a Report of
Private Investigation conducted by the SEC's Division of Enforcement con-
cerning false and misleading statements of material facts made by Fidelity
Savings and Loan Association (Fidelity S&L) and its parent corporation,
Fidelity Financial Corporation (Fidelity Corp.), in connection with the offer
and sale of retail repurchase agreements by Fidelity S&L [115]. The Report
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indicated that Fidelity S&L and Fidelity Corp. had violated the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws by making materially false and
misleading statements and omitting to state material facts to offerees and
purchasers of retail repurchase agreements sold by Fidelity S&L, concerning
(1) nature of the security interest in the collateral backing the retail repos; (2)
the existence of a trust holding the securities, and (3) the financial condition of
the S&L. These firms also failed to disclose material information concerning
Fidelity S&L's financial condition in a year-end press release. (Fidelity S&L
was declared insolvent several months later.)
3.3.1.3. Banking law issues raised by retail repos. In May 1981 the Comptroller
of the Currency and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board each issued advisory
materials regarding supervisory and legal issues raised by retail repo programs
[116]. The respective banking agencies' guidelines focused on several major
features of retail repo arrangements:
(1) Institutions were urged to develop safeguards to prevent mismatching of
assets and obligations where the funds are used to purchase fixed rate
investments with maturities longer than that of the retail repos.
(2) The market value of the collateral underlying a retail repo at least should
equal the principal amount of the issuing institution's obligation.
(3) The customer's security interest in the collateral security underlying the
retail repo should be perfected under state law.
(4) Customers should receive disclosures concerning the material aspects of
the retail repo arrangement [117].
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Board have also approved new rules
permitting federal S&Ls automatically to renew retail repurchase agreements
[118]. In addition, the three agencies determined to allow retail repos to be
used in connection with "sweeps" from a customer's account into a retail repo.
Under these arrangements, funds above a certain balance may be automati-
cally transferred into a retail repo issued by the bank or S&L with minimum
delay and paperwork. Previously, the inability of banks and S&Ls to renew
automatically their retail repos made sweeps into retail repos cumbersome and
unattractive because customers were required to write or telephone the bank or
S&L to renew repos every time the repo was scheduled to mature. In addition,
because a new retail repo instrument was issued each time new funds were
swept from the account, customers conceivably would be required to contact
the bank or S&L every day [119].
3.3.2. The money market deposit account
Recent legislation has empowered depository institutions to offer a non-in-
terest rate regulated deposit account in order to compete with money market
funds. Pursuant to the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,
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the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee is directed to authorize a
new deposit account which must be "directly equivalent to and competitive
with money market mutual funds registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Investment Company Act of 1940" [120].
The new insured deposit account has the following principal characteristics:
" The minimum balance must be no less than $2,500.
* Compliance with the minimum balance requirement may be determined by
using an average balance for a period no longer than one month.
" No limitation exists on the amount of interest that may be paid unless the
average balance falls below $2,500, during which period the 5.25% NOW
account interest rate ceiling will be imposed.
" The account is available to all types of depositors.
" No minimum maturity period is required, but institutions must reserve the
right to require at least seven days notice prior to withdrawal, and may not
obligate themselves to pay any fixed or indexed rate for a period greater
than one month.
" Depository institutions whose accounts allow no more than six transfers per
month, no more than three of which can be effectuated by draft, are not
required to maintain any reserves to back money market accounts held by
individuals and are required to maintain reserves of only 3% for business
accounts subject to such restrictions. The minimum denomination of the
drafts and the preauthorized or automatic transfers is left to the individual
institutions to determine.
* There are no restrictions on the size and frequency of withdrawals by mail,
messenger, or in person. Telephone transfers to other accounts of the
depositor at the same institution are considered pre-authorized or automatic
transfers for the purposes of the six-transfer-limit on the account.
* There are no regulatory restrictions on additional deposits, and sweepsfronm
other accounts are permitted.
* Loans to meet the $2,500 minimum balance are prohibited.
" The rate of interest and other charges imposed on an overdraft credit
arrangement offered in connection with the account must not be less than
those imposed on overdrafts for customers that do not possess the account.
" To ensure compliance with the limits of six transfers per month, based on
either the date of the draft or date of payment, institutions may either
prevent a greater number of transfers or adopt procedures to monitor
accounts on an ex post basis and contact customers who have a greater
number of such transfers [121].
In addition, depository institutions may also offer a second type of money
market account: a "Super NOW" account which allows an unlimited number
of checks [122]. A depository institution may pay any rate of interest on a
"Super NOW" account, provided that the following restrictions, which also
apply to the money market deposit account, are observed: (1) an institution
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must reserve the right to require seven days' notice prior to withdrawal; (2)
compliance with the $2,500 average balance requirement may be computed
over a period no longer than one month; (3) the existing NOW account rate
(5.25%) applies to accounts that do not meet the average balance requirement;
(4) an interest rate may not be guaranteed for a period longer than one month;
and (5) loans are not permitted to meet the $2,500 initial or average balance
requirement.
This type of account is only available to individuals, non-profit organiza-
tions operated primarily for religious, philanthropic, charitable, educational,
fraternal and- other similar purposes, and to governmental units, and must be
backed with reserves of 12% of the deposit balances of such accounts.
Because sweeps into money market deposit accounts are permitted, retail
repos may be employed less frequently in sweep arrangements as the market-
rate instrument into which "swept" funds are invested.
3.4. Brokerage activities
3.4.1. Dividend reinvestment plans
In a dividend reinvestment plan, a bank arranges with shareholders of a
corporation for their dividends to be paid directly to the bank. The bank then
aggregates the dividends and buys additional shares of the company's stock on
behalf of each shareholder. The bank deducts certain fees and commissions as
compensation for the services it performs. Banking regulators have viewed this
activity as a variation on the traditional, permissible, agency activities that
banks perform on behalf of their customers [123].
3.4.2. Individual portfolio management
Individual portfolio management services offered by banks may involve a
number of accounts where the bank gives substantially the same investment
advice. Portfolio management services are regarded by banking agencies as an
extension of the traditional money management services performed by banks
for individual investors. If the bank's investment authority is discretionary,
however, individual portfolio management services may be subject to registra-
tion as an investment company under the Investment Company Act. A bank's
authority will be regarded as discretionary if a customer receives the impres-
sion "that his business is welcomed or that he will meet his objectives only
through consistently following the adviser's recommendations or as long as,
even without efforts to discourage the exercise of independent judgment, the
customer in fact follows the recommendations slavishly" [124].
3.4.3. Automatic investment services
Automatic investment services generally involve a mechanism where check-
ing account customers of a bank are permitted to designate a sum of money to
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be withdrawn, at regular intervals, from their account for investment in a
group of selected securities. Although the legality of automatic investment
services under the Glass-Steagall Act was challenged by the securities in-
dustry, in New York Stock Exchange v. Smith, the district court characterized
AIS as essentially an automated version of the traditional bank function of
acting as an agent for customers in purchasing securities and found the AIS to
be permissible under the Glass-Steagall Act and the federal securities laws.
[125].
3.4.4. "Discount brokerage"
Banking institutions have recently taken major steps to enter the brokerage
business. The two most prominent examples of these expansion attempts are
the acquisition by BankAmerica Corporation, parent holding company of the
Bank of America, of Charles Schwab, Inc., the nation's largest discount
brokerage firm [126], and the establishment by Security Pacific National Bank
of a newly created subsidiary to engage in discount brokerage activities [127].
Another example is the plan announced by the Union Planters Bank of
Memphis to acquire Brenner Steed & Associates, a regional discount broker,
and to offer securities brokerage services at the bank's branch offices and
affiliated banks [128]. Other banks, instead of buying brokerage firms, have
contracted to have special brokerage services performed on their behalf by
third parties [129].
3.4.4.1. Application of the Glass-Steagall Act to bank brokerage activities.
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. §24, provides that the business
of dealing in securities and stock by national (and state member) banks "shall
be limited to purchasing and selling securities and stock without recourse,
solely upon the order of and for the account of customers" [130]. The scope of
this language - which was originally viewed and construed narrowly by bank
regulators - is crucial to the ability of banks to offer brokerage services.
In 1935, for example, the Comptroller of the Currency testified, in connec-
tion with amendments to certain sections of the Glass-Steagall Act, that:
[The proposed amendment] makes it clear §16 of the Banking Act of 1933 was not intended to
prohibit national banks or member banks from buying or selling solely for the account of their
customers and as an accommodation thereto and not for their own account.
This is extremely important, particularly in communities remote from financial centers, and
since there is involved no investment by the bank of its own funds, no objections can be seen
thereto [131].
The legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act, enacted just one year
after passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, lends support to the argument that
banks were exempted from the statutory definitions of the terms "broker" and
"dealer" because Congress believed that the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited
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banks from being either brokers or dealers, except to a de mininis extent [1321.
In 1936, the Comptroller issued a bulletin cautioning that a "definite effort
by [a] bank to engage in the securities business for a profit rather than for
accommodation ran counter to the spirit and purpose of §16" [133]. These
views were codified in the Comptroller's first Digest of Opinions published in
1948 [134], although the compensation provision was relaxed slightly. In 1957,
however, the Comptroller eliminated the requirement that brokerage services
be provided on a non-profit basis, but retained the requirement that such
services were to be performed only as an accommodation for existing bank
customers [135]. More recent rulings by the Comptroller have permitted banks
to make a profit on stock purchase activities, and have not distinguished
between new and pre-existing bank customers [136].
In connection with a dispute as to the legality of a proposal by banks to
offer automatic investment services, the Comptroller explained the difference
between earlier and more recent positions of the Comptroller's Office. Char-
acterizing the early decisions as reflecting "the great caution of banking
regulations in the years immediately following the 1931-32 debacle" [1371, the
Comptroller explained that the earlier interpretations contained restrictions
that were not imposed by the statute itself, and accordingly were viewed as
erroneous [138]. New York Stock Exchange v. Smith, which eventually arose
from this dispute, upheld the legality of automatic investment services offered
by banks, analogizing those services to an automated version of traditional
bank agency functions. (The decision was subsequently vacated on procedural
grounds and therefore may not serve as a binding precedent.) However, AIS is
necessarily connected to an account at the sponsoring bank and, thus, New
York Stock Exchange v. Smith did not resolve the question whether a bank
may conduct a brokerage business serving customers who do not have pre-ex-
isting relationships with the bank as banking customers.
The court in New York Stock Exchange v. Smith did, however, spend
considerable time discussing its conclusion that providing AIS was consistent
with the spirit and purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act and did not generate
any of the secondary hazards identified by the Supreme Court in Investment
Company Institute v. Camp, even though the bank made a profit on its
brokerage transactions.
The Supreme Court's decision in Board of Governors v. Agnew, has also been
offered in support of the proposition that brokerage activities are not within
the prohibitions imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act [139]. Agnew interpreted
Section 32 of the Act, which prohibits directors, officers and employees from
jointly serving banks and securities firms. In the course of ascertaining the
meaning of the term "primarily" as used in Section 32, the Supreme Court
treated the terms "issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at
wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or
other securities", as excluding brokerage activities [140]. The Court's opinion
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equated the statutorily prohibited activities with underwriting and dealing, and
not stock brokerage.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Board of Governors v. Investment
Company Institute, however, may hint at a different view of the meaning of
similar language in Section 21 of the Act. In its decision, the Court observed
that Section 21 "was intended to require securities firms such as underwriters
or brokerage houses to sever their banking connections" [141].
3.4.4.2. Application of the Glass-Steagall Act to brokerage activities by bank
affiliates. The application of the Glass-Steagall Act to bank brokerage activi-
ties has been argued to vary somewhat when activities are conducted by an
affiliate of the bank, rather than the bank itself. Section 20 of the Act prohibits
banks from having affiliates that are "principally" engaged in specified securi-
ties activities; thus, even if securities brokerage were prohibited by the
Glass-Steagall Act, a secondary question would arise as to whether a bank
affiliate was "principally" engaged in the activity. According to the Supreme
Court's discussion in Board of Governors v. Agnew, the "principally" engaged
test of Section 20 involves a higher level of securities involvement than does the
"primary" or substantial test under Section 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act [142].
The Comptroller of the Currency examined the application of Section 20 in
the course of approving the application by Security Pacific National Bank to
offer discount brokerage services through a newly-created bank subsidiary,
Security Pacific Discount Brokerage Services, Inc. [143]. Despite previous
restrictive interpretations of the permissible extent of bank brokerage activities,
the Comptroller concluded that discount brokerage was a permissible activity
for the subsidiary of a national bank, characterizing those early interpretations
as overly and unnecessarily restrictive, and pointing to New York Stock
Exchange v. Smith. As another basis for its approval, the Comptroller relied
upon the Supreme Court's Agnew decision, which appeared to exclude securi-
ties brokerage from the type of activities prohibited under certain provisions of
the Glass-Steagall Act.
3.4.4.3. Application of the Bank Holding Company Act to brokerage activities by
bank holding companies. Still another series of issues is presented where
brokerage activities will be conducted, not by a bank or bank subsidiary, but
by a bank affiliate which is part of a bank holding company structure. In
addition to the question of whether the activity is permissible for a bank
affiliate under the Glass-Steagall Act, the Federal Reserve Board must con-
clude, first, that brokerage activities are "closely related" to banking, and
second, that the competitive benefits of the proposed activity outweigh possible
adverse effects.
The leading case defining the "closely related" standard under the Bank
Holding Company Act is National Courier Association o. Board of Governors
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[144]. In National Courier, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit described the criteria used to determine whether an
activity is "closely related" to banking so as to be permissible under Section
4(c) (8) of the Bank Holding Company Act. An activity is "closely related" if:
(a) banks generally have, in fact, provided the proposed services; (b) banks
generally provide services that are operationally or functionally so similar to
the proposed services as to equip them particularly well to provide the
proposed services; and (c) banks generally provide services that are intrinsi-
cally related to the proposed services as to require their provision in a
specialized form [145].
The second standard for approval of an activity under the Bank Holding
Company Act is that the competitive benefits of the proposed activity out-
weigh its possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of economic
resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or unsafe or
unsound banking practices [146].
The Federal Reserve Board's consideration - and approval - of the Bank
Corp.'s (parent holding company of the Bank of America) acquisition of
Charles Schwab & Co., the leading discount securities broker in the United
States provided an opportunity for a thorough examination of these Bank
Holding Company Act issues as well as the applicability of the Glass-Steagall
Act [147]. In approving the acquisition, the Board first concluded that bank
holding companies are not prohibited from engaging in the type of discount
brokerage services offered by Schwab. The Board determined that Schwab's
activities were closely related to banking because many banks currently offer
types of brokerage services to their customers that resemble Schwab's activities.
Moreover, the Board noted that the authority of national banks under 12
U.S.C. §24 to purchase and sell securities without recourse, solely upon the
order and for the account of customers, supported the conclusion that Schwab's
brokerage activities, "which are within the plain meaning of the language of
this authorization", were closely related to banking.
The Board also found the extension of margin credit by Schwab to be
closely related to banking because "banks generally and traditionally have
extended credit to their customers for the purpose of buying and carrying
securities". And, the Board found Schwab's maintenance of customer securities
accounts and securities custodial services to be closely related to banking and a
necessary incident to permissible securities brokerage and margin lending
activities.
The Board concluded that a variety of public benefits were likely to result
from the acquisition of Schwab by BankAmerica, including increased competi-
tion and increased convenience and efficiencies. In particular, the Board's
decision indicated that the acquisition "may induce full-line brokers to com-
pete more vigorously for brokerage business on the basis of price". Moreover,
the Board determined that the acquisition would not present significant
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adverse effects, in that it was unlikely to result in undue concentration of
resources or decreased competition, unfair competitive practices, or other
adverse effects.
Finally, the Board determined that the acquisition would be consistent with
the Glass-Steagall Act. The Board concluded that Section 20 of the Act, which
prohibits affiliations between Federal Reserve member banks and firms en-
gaged in certain securities activities, did not apply to BankAmerica/Schwab
because Schwab was not engaged principally in the "public sale" of securities
within the proscription of Section 20, by virtue of its retail brokerage activities.
The Board reasoned that retail brokerage did not constitute a "public sale" for
Section 20 purposes, emphasizing that the term "public sale" was used in
Section 20 together with other terms which generally refer to the process by
which new issues or large blocks of securities are distributed to the public, and
that, therefore, "public sale" should be given a meaning consistent with the
scope of those terms. In addition, the Board cited its own interpretations under
Section 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which did not apply Section 32 to
brokerage activities, as well as recent interpretations by the Comptroller of the
Currency, including the Comptroller's recent decision in the case of Security
Pacific National Bank. The Board also found no evidence in the legislative
history of the Glass-Steagall Act that bank brokerage activities were viewed as
a target of the Act's prohibitions, and rejected references to the legislative
history of the Securities Exchange Act as being probative of the scope of the
Glass-Steagall Act's prohibitions.
3.4.5. Municipal securities activities
Any bank, bank subsidiary, or department or division of a bank which acts
as a municipal securities dealer within the meaning of the Securities Exchange
Act must comply with the Exchange Act's registration requirements for muni-
cipal securities dealers and is subject to the rules of the SEC and the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board, as well as to those of applicable bank regulatory
agencies [ 148].
The Board's decision to approve the Schwab acquisition prompted an
outcry - and filing of a lawsuit to overturn the board's order - by securities
industry groups that contend- that the acquisition violates both the Bank
Holding Company Act and the Glass-Steagall Act [147a].
Municipal securities dealer activities include underwriting, trading, and
sales of municipal securities and financial advisory and consultant services for
issuers of municipal securities [149]. Recently, the staff of the SEC's Division
of Market Regulation advised the Comptroller of the Currency that banks
providing private placement advisory activities related to the issuance and sale
of industrial development bonds were involved in municipal securities transac-
tions within the meaning of the Exchange Act. The SEC staff concluded,
however, that banks did not have to register as municipal dealers if they act
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only as brokers, but would be subject to the registration requirements if they
buy and sell municipal securities for their own accounts other than in a
fiduciary capacity [150].
3.4.6. Futures commission merchant activities
The Federal Reserve Board has also approved applications under the Bank
Holding Company Act for J.P. Morgan & Co., Bankers Trust, and Citicorp to
act, through subsidiaries, as futures commission merchants ("FCMs") in
connection with financial futures [151]. The Board's first decision allowed
Morgan Futures Corp., a subsidiary of J.P. Morgan & Co., to act as an FCM
for customers by executing and clearing futures contracts in bullion, foreign
exchange, U.S. government securities, U.S. government money market instru-
ments, and certain other money market instruments.
The Board's first decision, however, did not signal a general receptiveness to
FCM activities. For example, in approving the Morgan application, the Board
specifically noted Morgan's century of experience in the cash bullion market.
The decision also relied upon the conclusion that Morgan "already trades in
futures contracts covering U.S. government securities for its own account, and
in the cash and forward markets for U.S. government securities on behalf of its
customers", and that Morgan's "experience in these activities has provided it
with useful expertise in areas that are operationally or functionally similar to
FCM activities for non-affiliated persons in government securities" [152]. In
addition, Morgan placed certain voluntary restrictions on its FCM activities to
safeguard against unfair competitive practices and unsound banking practices.
In the Board's subsequent approvals of the FCM activities of Bankers
Trust's subsidiary, BT Capital Markets Corp., and of similar activities by
Citicorp, the Board emphasized the importance of the Morgan decision as a
model, stressing the respects in which the subsequent applications paralleled
the Morgan application, and that the characteristics of the Morgan operation
on which the Board relied in granting Morgan's application were shared by the
other applicants.
Shortly after approving Morgan's application, however, the Board con-
cluded that applications of bank holding companies to act as FCMs required
consideration on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the Board declined to adopt
amendments to its bank holding company regulations to add acting as an
FCM to the list of pre-approved permissible bank holding company activities
[153].
The Comptroller of the Currency has also approved the application of the
North Carolina National Bank to engage in FCM activities through a bank
subsidiary. In addition, the National City Bank of Minneapolis has received
approval to establish a commodity trading adviser subsidiary [154].
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3.5. Investment advisory services
The Supreme Court's decision in Board of Governors v. Investment Company
Institute characterized investment advisory activities as a facet of the tradi-
tional fiduciary functions of banks [155]. However, the Court's decision
implied that the performance of investment advisory services for an open-end
fund (a mutual fund), where a bank has authority to make investment
decisions or otherwise to control investments of its advisee open-end invest-
ment company, may not be permissible under the Glass-Steagall Act [156].
The Board of Governors decision also concluded that investment advisory
services, provided in accordance with the restrictions imposed by the Federal
Reserve Board's regulations, are closely related to banking and therefore are a
permissible activity for bank holding company affiliates under the Bank
Holding Company Act [157].
3.6. Securities activities by U.S. branches of foreign banks
The International Banking Act of 1978 [158] (the "IBA") permits foreign
banks which maintain branches or agencies in the United States to retain
ownership or control of certain entities that engage in non-banking activities in
the United States, including affiliates (owned or controlled as of July 26, 1978)
which engage in the business of underwriting, distributing, or otherwise buying
or selling stocks, bonds, and other securities in the United States [159].
Affiliates which do not qualify for this "grandfather" provision, however, are
generally subject to the same limitations on their non-banking activities as
non-banking affiliates of bank holding companies regulated under the Bank
Holding Company Act [160].
3.7. Savings and loan association securities activities
3.7. 1. Securities activities conducted directly by S&Ls
The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act contains little reference to
savings and loan institutions, reflecting the fact that, at the time of the Act's
passage, S&Ls issued share accounts, not deposits, and generally lacked the
power, under federal or state law, to engage in the types of activities that gave
rise to the conflicts that the Glass-Steagall Act sought to address [161].
However, with the evolution of S &L deposit taking activities and enhancement
of other S&L powers, Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibits
"any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust or other similar
organization" engaged in enumerated securities activities from also engaging
"at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits
subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate
of deposit or other evidence of debt or upon request of depositor" is now
applicable to S&Ls.
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Other sections of the Glass-Steagall Act refer to national banks and
Federal Reserve member banks, however. Therefore, an unresolved question is
whether the provisions of Section 16, which permit national banks (and, by
reference, state member banks) to purchase and sell securities and stock
"without recourse, solely upon the order and for the account of customers"
and which has been relied upon, at least in part, as authority for banks to
conduct discount brokerage activities, may be read as creating an exception to
the provisions of Section 21 with respect to S&L activities, such as discount
brokerage.
Similarly, most of the securities law exemptions available for banks do not,
by their literal terms, refer to S&Ls. Therefore, questions remain as to whether
the exemptions from the Securities Act, Exchange Act, Investment Company
Act and Investment Advisers Act, available to "banks" and "bank"-sponsored
common trust funds and collective funds, are also available to S&Ls and
S&L-sponsored funds.
3.Z2. Federal Home Loan Bank Board proposed S&L service corporation
regulations
3.Z2.1. Background. One of the most active areas of securities-related activi-
ties by savings and loan associations has been in connection with activities
conducted - or sought to be conducted - by S&L subsidiaries, known as
service corporations. On February 25, 1982, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (the "FHLBB") issued for comment proposed amendments to its
regulations governing permissible activities of savings and loan service corpo-
rations [162]. The proposed rules sought to permit service corporations of
federally-chartered savings and loan associations to engage in a number of new
activities without prior scrutiny and approval by the FHLBB. These newly
authorized activities included securities brokerage, organizing and operating
mutual funds, and selling mutual fund shares.
3.7.2.2. Application of the Home Owners' Loan Act to S&L service corporation
securities activities. The FHLBB asserted that the service corporation statute
empowers S&L service corporations to engage in a wide range of activities,
including the newly proposed securities activities. According to the General
Counsel of the FHLBB:
[I]f Congress had intended to establish some definite standard for the [FHLBB] to apply, we
assume that it would have articulated one as it quite clearly did in the Bank Holding Company Act
to restrict activities of bank holding company subsidiaries, 12 U.S.C. Section 1843(c) (8), and the
Bank Service Corporation Act to limit the bank service corporations 1163].
Critics of the FHLBB's proposal, however, argued that S&L service corpo-
rations are limited purpose entities, and those purposes do not include engag-
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ing in the stock brokerage and mutual fund business [164]. Admittedly, federal
savings and loan associations are not expressly authorized to create or operate
investment companies or to engage in stock brokerage activities, and the
FHLBB's ability to define the powers of S&Ls is limited. Thus, it was argued
that the FHLBB may not "by its interpretation of the statute under which it
operates increase its power beyond that given by the legislative body" [1651.
The legislative history of the S&L service corporation statute indicates that
service corporations were to serve specific purposes closely supportive of the
basic functions of S&Ls, and that activities of service corporations would be
limited to functions "closely related" to the savings and loan business [166].
For example, the S&L service corporations are modelled upon bank service
corporations established under the Bank Service Corporation Act [167]. Under
that statute, prior to its amendment by the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982 [168], bank service corporations could engage only in a
limited range of "clerical, bookkeeping, accounting, statistical or similar func-
tions" [169].
3.7.2.3. Application of the Glass-Steagall Act. The FHLBB relied upon foot-
note 24 in Board of Governors v. Investment Company Institute in taking the
position that Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act - which prohibits certain
entities from simultaneously engaging in the securities business and the deposi-
tory banking business - did not prohibit S&Ls from having service corpora-
tions that engage in the activities contemplated by the FHLBB's rule. The
FHLBB has asserted that the Supreme Court's decision supports the position
"that Section 21 does not prohibit S&L service corporations from engaging in
securities activities" [170].
The FHLBB's proposal would have enabled S&Ls to join together to create
an S&L service corporation for the purpose of creating and operating an
investment company or engaging in stock brokerage - activities arguably
prohibited to the S&L directly under Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
Thus, it was urged that the fundamental policies articulated by the
Glass-Steagall Act could not be evaded by the nominal separation of pro-
hibited activities in an affiliated service corporation [171]. Opponents of the
FHLBB's proposals also argued that Congress, not the FHLBB, should decide
whether S&Ls are to be permitted to use service corporations to operate
mutual funds, and engage in the stock brokerage business [172].
3.7.2.4. Directive of the Garn-St. Germain Act Conference Report. The
FHLBB's effort to facilitate S&L entry into the mutual fund business by
S&L's new regulatory authority was halted, however, by Congress with the
directive contained in the Conference Report on the Garn-St. Germain Act
[173]. The report specifically stated that, by approving certain expanded
powers and activities for thrift institutions and by not authorizing the FHLBB
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to permit service corporations to engage in any new activities not previously
authorized, Congress intended that the FHLBB not approve, in the absence of
clear and specific Congressional authorization, any new regulation expanding
activities of service corporations other than to permit service corporations to
engage in activities permitted for federal thrift institutions [174]. The Con-
ference Report noted that the FHLBB was presently considering proposed
regulations that would expand significantly the permitted range of activities for
service corporations and that the conferees directed the FHLBB to withdraw
and take no further action on the proposed regulations. In response, the
FHLBB's service corporation rule-making, whereby S&L service corporations
would have been empowered to create, operate, distribute, and advise invest-
ment companies, has been withdrawn [175].
3.7.3. S&L service corporation brokerage joint venture
However, on May 6, 1982, the FHLBB approved a specific securities
brokerage joint venture proposal by a group of federal S&Ls: Coast Federal
Savings and Loan Association, California Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion, and Perpetual American Federal Savings and Loan Association [176]. The
S&Ls had submitted applications to the FHLBB for permission to establish an
S&L service corporation to be called the Savings Association Financial
Corporation ("SAFC"). The stock of SAFC would be owned substantially by
service corporations owned by each of the three applicant savings and loans
(some of the remaining stock would be available for investment by other
S&Ls). SAFC would, in turn, own the Savings Association Investment Securi-
ties ("SAIS") which proposed to engage in buying and selling stocks, bonds
and mutual fund shares for the account of others, providing investment
advisory services, including portfolio analysis and valuation, and offering
marketing and training to participating S&Ls and providing them with liquid-
ity management advice.
SAIS indicated that it would register with the SEC as a broker-dealer and
as a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. The
applicant S&Ls also indicated that SAIS would function by setting up
investment centers in the offices of participating S&Ls. Each center would be
separated from the rest of the S&L office by walls, partitions, or plants. At
least two individuals would staff each center. S&L branch and assistant
branch managers might be registered as broker-dealers and could divide their
time between traditional S&L activities and their brokerage duties.
The FHLBB approved the application after concluding that the proposed
activities were reasonably related to the activities of federal S&Ls and that the
Glass-Steagall Act did not prohibit S&Ls from establishing brokerage firms
through subsidiaries. The FHLBB noted that its implementing regulations
under the Home Owners' Loan Act required that the activities of S&L service
corporations be limited to those reasonably related to the activities of the
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parent S&L [177]. The FHLBB then went on to note, however, that the
activities in which federal S&Ls may engage have been expanded in recent
years, and that, in addition to the powers set out in the statute, the FHLBB
had "broad discretion to determine the nature and scope of the incidental
powers federal [S&Ls] may exercise in a rapidly changing marketplace and the
appropriateness and scope of the 'reasonably related' criterion that the
[FHLBB] has adopted" [178]. Thus, under this evolving standard, the FHLBB
was able to conclude that engaging in brokerage activities was reasonably
related to permissible activities of federal S&Ls, and therefore permissible for
the S&L service corporations.
The Board also concluded that, while Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act
may be applicable to S&Ls, the section did not apply to S&L subsidiaries,
such as service corporations. The FHLBB again relied on footnote 24 in the
Supreme Court's decision in Board of Governors, pointing out that a service
corporation is a separate organization which does not receive deposits but is
merely related by ownership to a depository institution:
It would not, therefore be subject to the section 21 prohibitions against issuing, underwriting.
selling, or distributing securities as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute [179].
The Treasury Department and the Justice Department were critical of the
FHLBB's approval of the S&L service corporation applications to engage in
brokerage activities. The Treasury Department, in particular, characterized the
approval as "the wrong approach to expansion of securities services by S & Ls
and banks" [ 180]. The Securities Industry Association (the "SIA") reacted even
more strongly and sued the FHLBB over its approval action, alleging that the
FHLBB exceeded its statutory authority by permitting S&L service corpora-
tions to form a securities brokerage subsidiary [181].
3.Z3.1. Application of the federal securities laws to S&L service corporation
brokerage activities. The FHLBB's approval of the Coast Federal et al. service
corporation applications was not the final regulatory hurdle for the S&L
brokerage joint venture, however. The applicant S & Ls' brokerage subsidiary,
SAIS, also applied to the SEC for a "no-action" letter that the S&Ls
participating in the SAIS program would not be required to register as
broker-dealers under Section 15(a) (1) of the Exchange Act [1821. SAIS argued
that registration was not required because the S&Ls (as opposed to SAIS)
would not be engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for
the account of others; and thus did not fall within the definition of "broker"
set forth in Section 3(a) (4) of the Exchange Act [183]. Apparently, since the
portfolios of many S&Ls contain low-yielding, illiquid mortgages, had the
participating S&Ls been subject to registration as broker-dealers, they would
have failed to meet broker-dealers' net capital requirements [184].
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The SAIS position was disputed by the Securities Industry Association. In
comments submitted to the SEC, the SIA argued that the participating S&Ls
would perform services designed to attract prospective buyers and sellers of
securities. The SIA asserted that "in situations involving the 'channeling' of
business by one person to a particular broker-dealer... the [SEC] staff usually
has required that the person register separately as a broker-dealer" [185].
Despite objections by the SIA, the "no-action" letter was approved by the
full Securities and Exchange Commission [186]. The letter indicated, however,
that the SEC did not necessarily agree with the contention that the participat-
ing S&Ls would not be deemed "brokers" under Section 3(a) (4), and
concluded that there were "substantial arguments to the contrary given the
structural and financial relationship between the participating S&Ls and
SAIS". Nevertheless, because SAIS would be a registered broker-dealer and
all participating S&L employees involved in securities activities would be fully
subject to SEC and self-regulatory organization requirements, the SEC con-
cluded that investor protection would not be enhanced by requiring the
participant S&Ls to register as broker-dealers, and that enforcement action
would not be recommended if the S&Ls themselves did not register.
Under different circumstances, therefore, the SEC could well require reg-
istration of the savings and loan association on whose premises another firm's
brokerage services were to be provided. In fact, shortly after issuing the SAIS
"no-action" letter, the SEC declined to issue a similar letter to Home Federal
Savings and Loan Association in connection with Home Federal's plan to offer
brokerage services to be provided by Fidelity Brokerage Services. The SEC
contended that Home Federal must also register as a broker-dealer, pointing
to, among other factors, the operating relationship between Home Federal and
Fidelity and the fact that Home Federal and Fidelity planned to split commis-
sions on securities transactions [187].
Home Federal subsequently revamped its compensation arrangements with
Fidelity, so that Home Federal would receive only a fixed monthly fee, and
limited the extent to which Home Federal employees could answer questions
concerning different types of brokerage accounts. Following these and other
changes, the SEC issued a "no-action" letter to Home Federal [188].
4. Legal issues presented by banking-related activities of securities firms
Just as the banking industry has sought to develop new products and
services to compete with the financial products and services available from
securities industry firms, so have securities industry firms - and other commer-
cial enterprises - sought to acquire banking institutions and provide services
resembling bank services. These efforts epitomize the increasingly blurred
distinctions between banking and commerce.
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4.1. Money market mutual funds
Money market mutual funds ("MMFs") developed by securities industry
firms have proved to be attractive investment vehicles. MMFs generally are
organized as corporations or business trusts, usually by an existing company
engaged in the business of providing investment management services such as a
brokerage firm or an investment adviser. Shares sold by a MMF to the public
represent equity ownership interests in the fund.
The capital raised from the sale of fund shares is invested by the fund in
money market instruments (generally short-term securities which pay attractive
market rates of interest) and the return from these investments, net of fund
expenses, is distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends. While a
typical mutual fund invests'its assets in equity securities and distributes its net
earnings on a quarterly basis, the typical MMF distributes net earnings in the
form of dividends which are declared daily and reinvested in additional shares
of the MMF [189].
Although MMFs resemble equity investment companies, they generally
provide an expedited means for effecting purchases and redemptions of MMF
shares. By wiring funds to a money market fund prior to a specified time, an
investor can have his money invested and earning dividends almost im-
mediately. Investors can also remain fully invested until the precise time they
require the use of the invested money by effecting redemptions by telephone
and having the proceeds wired by the MMF to a predesignated bank account
[1901.
Another means of redemption generally offered by MMFs is redemption of
MMF shares by means of drafts ("check writing"). This feature of MMFs has
led critics to question whether MMFs are, impermissibly, engaged in deposi-
tory banking, by receiving deposits subject to check. Since MMFs obviously
are in the business of "issuing... selling [and] distributing" securities, namely
the MMF shares, if a MMF were found to be engaged also in "receiving
deposits subject to check", the fund would be engaged in a combination of
activities prohibited by Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
Although the MMF draft redemption procedure superficially resembles a
checking account, the redemption feature actually operates quite differently. A
shareholder generally must expressly indicate that he wishes to avail himself of
the draft writing redemption feature in the application form submitted for the
purchase of fund shares. Then, if the shareholder wishes to redeem his shares,
he writes a draft drawn on the bank account of the fund maintained at the
fund's custodian bank (or a bank account established at that bank by the fund
for each of its shareholders). When the draft is presented for payment, the
transfer agent determines whether the shareholder has a sufficient investment
in the fund to cover the draft. If sufficient monies are available, the transfer
agent, acting as agent for the redeeming shareholder, effects the redemption of
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a sufficient number of the shareholder's shares to generate the money neces-
sary to honor the draft. The bank then makes payment on the draft from cash
in the MMF's account with the bank.
In most cases, the fund will have sufficient cash available in its custodial
account with its custodian bank so that redemptions through the draft writing
privilege are merely an offset against cash available for reinvestment by the
fund. However, where there is insufficient cash held by the custodian bank to
cover such redemptions, the fund liquidates portfolio securities or takes other
steps to meet redemptions [191].
MMFs generally impose certain restrictions or limitations on draft writing.
For example, MMFs usually require that the investor meet certain minimum
investment requirements in order to initially purchase shares of the fund. In
addition, investors are usually limited to a specific minimum amount for which
a draft check can be written. Frequently, this minimum is $500.
The MMF draft writing feature was scrutinized by the Justice Department,
which determined that the redemption procedure did not cause a MMF to be
engaged in the business of banking. The Department of Justice concluded that:
Availability of particular mechanisms for an investor to transfer his ownership is a mere formality
and serves in no way to alter the substance of his status as owner. As between him and the fund,
the potential for capital gain or loss on his investment remains unaffected by the means he may
select to realize his investment and he is not by his selection of the mechanism of a combined order
to sell and pay over (check) to realize his investment, converted into a mere creditor of the fund
with no expectation of capital gain or loss from the fund upon realization [192].
This conclusion subsequently was reaffirmed by the Department of Justice
[193].
4.2. "Cash management" accounts
4.2.1. Description of "CMA"-type accounts
The "Cash Management Account" (" CMA") offered by Merrill Lynch,
Pierce Fenner & Smith, the largest U.S. brokerage firm, was the pioneer of the
"cash management" type accounts now offered by many of the major securi-
ties brokerage houses. These accounts combine a securities brokerage account,
a choice of several money market funds, a checking account with a bank, and a
debit card issued by the bank which enables an account holder to have ready
access to his funds [194]. Money coming into an account through a deposit,
sale of stock, or the payment of the dividend or interest is swept on a daily
basis into a money market fund specified by the customer. When the customer
purchases securities, writes a check on the account, or uses his debit card, the
appropriate amount of money is automatically withdrawn from the money
market fund until the customer's MMF account is exhausted. After that point,
additional money may be loaned by the bank to the customer using securities
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in the customer's brokerage account as security for the loan. To open the
Merrill Lynch CMA, a minimum investment of $20,000 in cash and/or
securities currently is required.
4.2.2. Application of the McFadden Act
The nationwide scope of cash management accounts - for example, the
firms offering the accounts have offices in many states and a customer may
trigger a margin loan from any location - prompted questions whether offering
such accounts constitutes an interstate banking impermissible under the Mc-
Fadden Act.
The McFadden Act permits banks to establish "branches" across state lines
only to the extent that state statutes permit their state banks to branch across
state lines. Since only five states allow any type of interstate banking, the
McFadden Act effectively places severe limitations on the ability of banks to
operate on an interstate basis [195].
The term "branch" is statutorily defined to include any branch bank,
branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of
business where deposits are received, checks paid out, or money lent [196]. In
an interpretative ruling, the Comptroller of the Currency has also specifically
addressed the question of what constitutes "lending money". The ruling
excluded from the definition of "lending money":
origination of loans by employees or agents of the national bank or a subsidiary corporation at
locations other than the main office or a branch office... [provided] that the loans are approved
and made at main office or a branch of the bank or at an office of the subsidiary location on the
premises of or contiguous to the main office or branch of the bank [197].
In connection with the application by Security Pacific National Bank to
conduct discount brokerage activities through a new subsidiary corporation,
the Comptroller concluded that it was permissible for Security Pacific's new
discount brokerage subsidiary to interview and counsel customers on loan rates
and terms, aid customers in completing margin loan applications, and then
transmit loan applications to an authorized branch office where they would be
processed and from which office credit would actually be extended. The
Comptroller reasoned that the performance of solicitation and origination
activities in connection with the extension of margin credit which then actually
took place at an authorized branch office would not constitute lending money
within the meaning of the McFadden Act [1981.
These precedents would also appear to distinguish cash management-type
accounts from impermissible "lending" activities. For example, in the case of
the Merrill Lynch CMA, the actual extension of margin credit is done by Bank
One, a duly authorized bank located in Ohio. In fact, Merrill submitted its
CMA plan to the Federal Reserve Board for scrutiny before the plan was
175
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offered to the public, and the Board advised Merrill Lynch that nothing in
existing law or regulations prevented the introduction of that kind of account
[199].
4.3. Marketing of bank accounts and certificates of deposit
Securities industry firms also have developed cooperative relationships with
banks and S&Ls whereby brokerage firms market debt instruments issued by
particular banks and S&Ls to the brokerage firms' wider customer base. The
first such arrangement involved "All Savers" certificates, whereby customers of
certain major brokerage firms located across the United States could purchase
"All Savers" certificates issued by various S&Ls [200]. As the marketing of
"All Savers" certificates was the first joint marketing effort, it was also the first
to be attacked under state banking laws as an authorized banking activity. In
none of the relevant cases, however, has securities firms' marketing of "All
Savers" certificates been found to be impermissible [201].
The involvement of brokerage houses in the marketing of "All Savers"
certificates proved to be a prelude to even more extensive activity by brokerage
firms in creating a retail market for bank certificates of deposit. For example,
Merrill Lynch has created a secondary market for certain certificates of deposit
and has begun to market CDs issued by certain banks and S&Ls [202]. Other
firms have announced an intention to engage in similar activities. As a result, a
person interested in purchasing (insured) CDs may do so through his
stockbroker. Moreover, since certain firms have indicated their willingness to
create a secondary market in CDs, if the customer ever wants to sell the CD
the brokerage firm will repurchase the CD at the prevailing secondary market
rate.
A new opportunity for securities firms to market a type of bank deposit also
appears to be presented by the money market deposit account authorized by
the Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. Indeed, one securi-
ties firm will even handle switching its customers' money from one of its funds
into a money market account at a bank. The securities firm handles the
transaction and the bank pays it a fee.
In another variation of securities firms' marketing bank deposits, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board recently issued an opinion, in response to a
request by Merrill Lynch, that the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation ("FSLIC"), the FHLBB's insurance arm, would consider a par-
ticipation in a jumbo certificate of deposit issued by a savings and loan
association to be the same as an account at the savings and loan for the
purposes of federal deposit insurance [203]. (A similar opinion has also been
expressed by the FDIC.) The FHLBB's position thus would enable a brokerage
firm to purchase very large face value certificates of deposit and sell interests
in the certificates with interests to be covered by deposit insurance.
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Under Merrill Lynch's plan, as described in the FHLBB's opinion, CDs
would be purchased by a dealer in CDs, who would resell the CDs to a
broker-dealer. The broker-dealer, in turn, would sell participation interests in
particular CDs to individual investors. After the sale of the participation
interests, the broker-dealer would continue to hold the CDs as agent or
nominee for the participation holders, and the issuing institution's records
would reflect this fact.
However, the Securities and Exchange Commission declined to issue a
"no-action" letter to Merrill Lynch that participations in the proposed port-
folio of certificates of deposit were not securities requiring registration under
the Securities Act, or that the trust which would hold the portfolio of CDs was
not an investment company requiring registration under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 [204]. The Commission staff found the participations to
constitute "securities" under the Investment Company Act, because the par-
ticipations constituted certificates of interest or participation in a profit-shar-
ing agreement, transferable shares, and investment contracts.
Despite the SEC's refusal to issue a "no-action" letter, Merrill Lynch
appears to have taken the steps necessary to proceed with its plan to market
participations in CDs. The firm recently announced that it was offering "Six
Month Insured CD Participations".
4.4. Acquisitions of "non-bank" banks
Another recent phenomenon in the financial industry has been the acquisi-
tion by securities firms or other non-banks of state chartered trust companies
and newly restructured "non-bank" banks. Generally, the Bank Holding
Company Act requires that any company owning a "bank" must divest itself
of its non-banking business and limit its business and that of its affiliates to
banking activities and other activities deemed to be closely related to banking
[205]. The acquisition of non-banks is premised on the BHCA's definition of a
"bank", which provides that a bank is an institution that both accepts demand
deposits and makes commercial loans [206]. Thus, if a depository institution
does not make commercial loans, or discontinues its commercial loan business,
the depository institution becomes a so-called "non-bank" bank, arguably not
subject to the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act.
One example of a corporation owning both a securities brokerage firm and
a "non-bank" bank is American Express, which owns both Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, a major securities brokerage house, and the Boston Safe Deposit
and Trust Company [207]. Similarly, the Fidelity Group of securities firms
recently created a trust company [208].
In related developments, non-financial companies have also acquired "non-
banks", i.e. institutions that accept demand deposits but do not make commer-
cial loans. For example, Gulf & Western Corporation acquired Fidelity Na-
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tional Bank of Concord, California [209]. Fidelity divested its commercial loan
portfolio and ceased its commercial lending activities. It thereby became a
"consumer bank" outside the definition of the term "bank" under the BHCA.
However, Gulf & Western did have to notify the Comptroller of the Currency
before acquiring Fidelity, since Fidelity did meet the definition of "bank" set
forth in the Change in Bank Control Act [210].
Similarly, Household International, Inc., a major finance company, acquired
Valley National Bank in Salinas, California, after Valley spun-off its com-
mercial loan portfolio and ceased to be a BHCA "bank" [211]. Citizens
National Bank of Tilden, New Hampshire, also spun-off its commercial loan
portfolio to enable it to be acquired by the Parker Pen Company [212].
Chrysler Corporation has also established Automative Financial Services Com-
pany, Inc., a limited purpose state-chartered bank designed to act as Chrysler's
bank of initial deposits [213]. In this case, the Federal Reserve Board con-
cluded that the limited purpose bank was not a "bank" under the BHCA,
provided that its investment activities were restricted as indicated.
The Federal Reserve Board has attempted to halt the trend of acquisitions
of "non-bank" banks, however, using the acquisition of Lincoln State Bank by
Dreyfus Corporation as the vehicle to close an apparent loophole in the Bank
Holding Company Act. The Board stated that:
Dreyfus' proposed acquisition of Lincoln Bank is the latest example of a recent trend by
nonbanking organizations to acquire commercial banks and to transform such banks into so-called
"nonbank banks" by divesting the bank's commercial loan portfolio in an effort to avoid the
prohibitions of the BHCC Act [214].
The Board's letter noted that the acquisition of "non-bank banks" by
non-banking organizations such as Dreyfus was predicated upon an amend-
ment to the definition of "bank" in the BHCA in 1970, which added to the
demand deposit test in the BHCA the requirement that the institution also be
engaged in the business of making commercial loans. The Board asserted that
the legislative history of the BHCA showed that this amendment was designed
for a limited and special situation involving a single trust company and that
the amendment was to be narrowly applied by the Board [215].
According to the Board, between 1970 and 1981 the exemption remained
within the narrow confines intended by Congress, and the Board's apparent
acquiescence in other acquisitions of non-bank banks was consistent with this
restrictive approach.
The Board asserted that during the past year it had noted the large number
of acquisitions of "non-bank banks" by non-banking organizations, and had
considered the potential for evasion of the purposes of the BHCA that was
present in the combination of such banking and non-banking organizations. In
particular, the Board was concerned that the proliferation of such acquisitions
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would allow for the expansion of banking across state lines without either state
authorization or Congressional approval.
Accordingly, the Board concluded that action was necessary to confine the
so-called "non-bank bank" exception to the scope originally intended by
Congress. The Board asserted that Dreyfus could not lawfully acquire shares of
Lincoln Bank without obtaining the Board's prior approval. Accordingly, the
Board requested that the FDIC advise Dreyfus that Dreyfus' notice with
respect to its proposed acquisition of Lincoln Bank was, as a matter of law,
improperly filed under the Change in Bank Control Act, because of the
Board's formal determination that the proposed bank acquisition was subject
to the Bank Holding Company Act and that Dreyfus could not consummate its
proposed acquisition in reliance on the Change in Bank Control Act. The
Board indicated further, that if Dreyfus attempted to proceed with the acquisi-
tion, the Board would issue an order blocking the transaction. However, the
FDIC elected to approve the acquisition under the Change in Bank Control
Act, and Dreyfus consummated the acquisition, leaving the next move up to
the Board, which has yet to take further action to attempt to block Dreyfus.
4.5. Creation of a bank by a securities firm
4.5.1. Dreyfus National Bank
Perhaps the most aggressive effort by a securities firm to engage in banking
activities is the recent application by the Dreyfus Corporation, to the Comp-
troller of the Currency, for permission to form its own national bank, Dreyfus
National Bank and Trust Company [216].
Dreyfus recognized that the ownership of a national bank by a major
securities firm would present problems under the Glass-Steagall Act and, in its
application to the Comptroller, Dreyfus argued that Sections 20 and 32 of the
Act were inapplicable, because the income derived by Dreyfus from activities
covered by Sections 20 and 32 was minuscule [217]. Dreyfus also contended
that, under the Board of Governors decision, the prohibitions imposed by
Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act were applicable only to a single corpora-
tion which engages both in commercial banking and investment banking [218].
Dreyfus attempted to avoid the reach of Sections 20 and 32 by arguing that
only a minor portion of its income was derived from the types of activities
covered by these sections. Dreyfus used Federal Reserve Board Staff Opinions
as a measure of the percentage of income that constitutes being "principally"
and "primarily" involved in activities subject to Sections 20 and 32. According
to these Staff Opinions, a securities firm that receives 10% of its gross income
from activities described in Section 32 is generally deemed to be "primarily
engaged" within the meaning of that section [219], and the term "principally
engaged" for the purposes of Section 20 is deemed to be satisfied if 257 of a
firm's total revenue is derived from the activities described in that section
[220].
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The Federal Reserve Board reacted adversely to Dreyfus' effort to gain a
national bank charter. In a letter to the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Board opposed the Dreyfus application, asserting that the proposed Dreyfus
Bank would violate the Glass-Steagall Act [221]. In the Board's view, the
creation of Dreyfus National Bank would be in direct contravention of Section
20 as interpreted by the Board, since Dreyfus National Bank would clearly be
a member bank, and from the information available, it was evident that
Dreyfus had established the mutual funds it manages, that it directs such
funds' operations, and that Dreyfus exercises a pervasive and dominant
influence over the funds and thus controls them for purposes of Section 20.
The Board also asserted that, since a mutual fund is "primarily engaged in
the issue" of securities for purposes of Section 32 of the Act, a director, officer,
or employee of a member bank may not serve in a similar capacity with a
mutual fund [222]. Moreover, the Board noted that it had ruled that Section 32
prohibits a management interlock between a member bank and an investment
advisory firm that manages a mutual fund (like Dreyfus), even if the advisory
company itself is not engaged in any securities activity [223]. Based on the
close functional and structural relationship between the advisory company and
the mutual fund being managed, the Board found that the advisory company
and the fund constituted a single entity for purposes of Section 32 [224]. Thus,
according to the Board, if Dreyfus established any management interlocks
between Dreyfus National Bank and itself, or any of the Dreyfus-managed
mutual funds, such interlock also would violate Section 32.
The Comptroller of the Currency rejected tie Board's arguments that the
Dreyfus National Bank would violate either the Bank Holding Company Act
or the Glass-Steagall Act, however, and approved the charter for the Dreyfus
National Bank & Trust Company [225]. The Comptroller concluded that the
Bank Holding Company Act posed no impediment to the Dreyfus National
Bank because the bank would neither accept demand deposits nor make
commercial loans - the two criteria which make a financial institution a
"bank" for the purposes of the BHCA. The Comptroller rejected the expanded
definition of commercial loan activities which the Federal Reserve Board had
advanced, and cited previous opinions of the Board which the Comptroller
claimed to be inconsistent with the Board's new, expanded definition of a
commercial loan. The Comptroller's decision also reviewed the legislative
history of the BHCA and found no support in the language or purpose of the
BHCA for the Board's attempted new interpretation of the activities that
constituted commercial lending.
The Comptroller also concluded that the creation and operation of the
Dreyfus National Bank was not prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act. The
Comptroller asserted that the relationship between Dreyfus and Dreyfus
National Bank would not constitute an impermissible affiliation between a
bank and an entity which is "engaged principally in the issue, flotation,
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underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through
syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities..."
under Section 20 of the Act because, under the Comptroller's "single entity"
theory, the consolidated Dreyfus entity derived less than 1% of its total
revenues from Section 20 activities. Under the Comptroller's "single entity"
theory, Dreyfus Corp. and its subsidiaries, which distribute and advise the
Dreyfus family of mutual funds, as well as other funds, were treated as a single
entity, essentially because the subsidiaries' activities are performed on behalf of
Dreyfus Corp. The Comptroller declined to include Dreyfus-advised funds in
the "single entity", however, thereby rejecting the more inclusive "single
entity" analysis advanced by the Board.
In particular, the Comptroller looked to the independent director require-
ments imposed by the Investment Company Act on mutual fund boards of
directors, and concluded that Dreyfus' mutual fund advisory activities did not
result in Dreyfus controlling the mutual funds it advised. The Comptroller's
analysis, and his reference to and reliance upon Investment Company Act
standards to limit the scope of the pertinent "single entity", followed the
reasoning first articulated only days before in the Comptroller's decision in
connection with approval of. the national bank charter for J&W Seligman
Trust Company, N.A., a non-bank bank created by an investment adviser to a
family of mutual funds [226]. Finding that an investment adviser did not
control the funds it advises, the Comptroller therefore did not include
Dreyfus-advised funds in the Dreyfus "single entity" - an approach which
would have produced a Glass-Steagall problem, since the Dreyfus National
Bank would then have been impermissibly affiliated with an entity "princi-
pally engaged" in Section 20 activities.
4.6. The Comptroller's "nmoratorium" on new non-bank banks
The Comptroller's decisions in the cases of J&W Seligman Trust Co. and
Dreyfus National Bank brought the Comptroller's office squarely into conflict
with the Federal Reserve Board on two issues critical to the extent to which
non-banking entities, particularly securities industry firms, may conduct a
banking business. First, the two agencies disagreed on the meaning of a
"commercial loan" for the purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act;
second, the agencies also disagreed on the question of what entity controls a
mutual fund for Glass-Steagall Act purposes [227].
Following the Comptroller's grant of a national bank charter to J&W
Seligman Trust Co. - over the objections of the Federal Reserve Board - the
New York Federal Reserve Bank signaled to Seligman that the Federal
Reserve Board did not intend to give up on its opposition to the Seligman
Trust Co. The Federal Reserve Bank pointed out the requirement that national
banks, such as the Seligman Trust Co., purchase Federal Reserve stock from
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
182 H.L Pitt, J.L. Williams / Convergence of commercial and investment banking
their appropriate Federal Reserve Bank - in this case the New York Federal
Reserve Bank - in order to operate, and then informed Seligman that if
Seligman purchased such stock, it could be liable for damages up to $1,000 per
day it remained in business, since its business, in the Federal Reserve Bank's
view, would constitute a violation of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act
[228].
The Comptroller promptly wrote to Seligman and told the firm to ignore the
Federal Reserve Bank. The Comptroller stated that its decision to grant a
national bank charter to Seligman "is entitled to great weight and isn't subject
to review by another agency after the fact". "Irrespective of the Federal
Reserve's threat", wrote the Comptroller, the new bank had the "complete
support of the Office of the Comptroller to the Currency [229]". Shortly after
the Comptroller wrote to Seligman, Seligman proceeded to purchase the
Federal Reserve stock it needed to begin operations and opened for business
[230]. Before the Federal Reserve Board reacted, however, the Comptroller was
able to effect a truce with the Federal Reserve Board by declaring a moratorium,
through 1983, on new non-bank banks.
The Comptroller's moratorium on new national bank charters for non-bank
banks is scheduled to last through 1983. In announcing the moratorium,
effectively a temporary truce with the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller
indicated that the freeze on non-bank banks was intended to "help foster free
and open debate" on financial industry restructuring, and "reduce the pressure
of escalating marketplace innovation at the national level that could outpace
Congressional deliberation" [231]. To date, however, neither the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation nor the Federal Home Loan Bank Board have
indicated that they will adopt a freeze on acquisitions or new charters for
depository institutions subject to their respective jurisdictions, where the
depository institution would be owned, by a non-banking or non-thrift firm,
respectively.
Thus, the main benefit of the Comptroller's moratorium is expected to be a
resumption of negotiations between the Federal Reserve Board and the Comp-
troller concerning amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act's definition
of "bank", with a view toward closing non-bank bank loophole [2321.
5. Conclusion
In this article we have reviewed the developments in the financial services
industry which have arisen in connection with efforts of banking institutions to
enter the securities field and, conversely, efforts by securities firms to offer
various banking and near-banking services. At times, existing legislation has
seemed inconsistent with these efforts, and courts, regulatory agencies, and
participants in the financial services industry have struggled to come to grips
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with the rapid pace of these changes, many of which run counter to the
historical premises and statutory framework within which the American finan-
cial industry has operated.
At present, we are witnessing pressures for the restructuring of both the
financial services industry and the regulatory framework within which that
business is conducted. Sometimes this pressure is relieved by new regulatory
approaches or court decisions, sometimes with the aid of sympathetic regula-
tors (without the attendant necessity of obtaining legislative change). As
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman John Shad recently put it:
"the financial services industries have outgrown their suits of regulatory
armor. They are bursting at the seams" [2331.
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[19] 26 Fed. Res. Bull. 393 (1940).
[20] 10 Fed. Reg. 8953 (1945), 12 C.F.R. §206.17(a) (3).
[21] See Common Trust Fund Publicity, 92 Trusts and Estates, at 319-320 (May, 1953). In a
February 1953 interpretation, the Board again stated its views concerning the merchardising of
investment funds, emphasizing that "the common trust fund is not to be regarded as an investment
entity to be popularized in and of itself". 41 Fed. Res. Bull. 142 (1953). The Board stated that any
publicity by banks concerning their common trust fund services "should be directed toward
demonstrating the desirability of and need for corporate fiduciary services". Id.
[22] Pub. L. No. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668.
[23] See 12 C.F.R. §§9.18(b)(5) (iv) and (b)(5)(v).
[24] 15 U.S.C. §§80a-I et seq.
[25] 15 U.S.C. §§77a et seq.
[26] See, e.g., Hacker & Rotunda, The SEC's Ectoplasndc Theory of an Issuer Applied to
Educational and Charitable Institutions, Bank Trustees, and Other Exempt Issuers, 65 Calif. L. Rev.
1181 (1977); see also Prudential Insurance Company of America 0. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (1st Cir.,
1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953.
[27] 15 U.S.C. §77c(2) (2).
[28] 15 U..C. §80a-3(c) (3).
[29] Hearings on Common Trust Funds - Overlapping Responsibility and Conflict in Regulation,
Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
4 (Statement of SEC Chairman Cary), cited in United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A. (avail.
Dec. 1, 1981).
[30] See, eg., United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A., supra note 29; Mechanics Bank (avail.
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Jan. 5, 1981); William C. Connelly (avail. May 1, 1980); The Howard Savings Bank (avail. Aug 13,
1979); Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust (avail. June 19, 1976); BanCal Capital Management Corp.
(avail. Dec. 4. 1974); Bank of Delaware (avail. Jan 7. 1973); Madison Bank & Trust Co. (avail. May
27, 1972). Thus, the promotion or advertising of a common trust fund will jeopardize the
availability of the exemptions. See e.g., BanCal Capital Management Corp., supra; First City
Bancorp. of Texas (avail. Feb 3, 1978); Texas Commerce Bank (avail. Jan. 26, 1978).
[31] See, e.g., The Howard Savings Bank, supra note 30; Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust, supra
note 30; Madison Bank & Trust, supra note 30.
[321 Id.
[331 See, e.g., Genesee Merchants Bank and Trust, supra note 30.
[34] 20 Fed. Reg. 3305 (1955), 12 C.F.R. §206.10(c).
[35] Pub. L. No. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668 (1962).
[36] 12 C.F.R. §9.18.
[37] 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
[38] 12 C.F.R. §9.18(a) (1).
[39] 12 C.F.R. §9.18(a) (2).
[40] See, e.g., Wade, Bank-Sponsored Collective Investment Funds: An Analysis of Applicable
Federal Banking and Securities Laws, 35 Bus. Law. 361 (1980).
[41] Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413.
[421 Id.
[43] See, e.g., Nat'l. Bak of Fairfax (avail. Dec. 29, 1976); Mechanics Nat'l Bank of Worcester
(reconsideration avail. July. 21, 1975); Texarkana Nat'l Bank (avail. Apr. 11, 1975); First Natl
Bank of Brunswick (avail. May 19. 1971).
[44] See, e.g., Millikin Nat'l Bank of Decatur (avail. Mar. 31, 1979); Gary-Wheaton Bank (avail.
Dec. 1, 1975).
[45] But see Securities Act Release No. 5450, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 2340, (January 7, 1974)
where the SEC indicated that the staff would consider requests for "no-action" positions on the
availability of the intrastate offering exemption "only on an infrequent basis and in the most
compelling circumstances".
[46] See United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A. (Avail. Dec. 1, 1981); Owensboro National
Bank (avail. July 19, 1981); Citytrust (avail. March 9, 1980); Continental Illinois National Bank and
Trust Co. of Chicago (avail. April 28, 1975), (reconsideration denied, avail Jan. 19, 1976). But see
Fiduciary Trust Company of New York (avail. Nov. 9, 1981) (particular type of IRA authorized
under §401 rather than §408).
[47] Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application by Citibank, N.A., [Current]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 99,339 (October 21, 1982).
[48] Registration was necessary because IRAs are tax-exempt under Section 401 rather than
Section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code, and thus do not qualify for the ICA and Securities Act
exemptions discussed above.
[49] 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
[50] 401 U.S. at 624.
[50a] Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application by Citibank, N.A., supra
note 47.
[50b] See Investment Company Institute v. Conover (D.D.C. No. 83-0549, Complaint filed
February 24, 1983).
[51] 12 C.F.R. §218.101.
[52] 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
[53] 450 U.S. at 58-59, n. 24.
[54] See, e.g., Whitney National Bank o. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 323 F.2d 290 (D.C.
Cir., 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 379 U.S. 411 (1965); Casanova Guns, Inc. v. Connally, 454 F.2d
1320 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 845 (1972); P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261
(6th Cir., 1970); Valley Finance Inc. v. U.S., 629 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir., 1980); Allied industrial
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Cartage Co. v. C KI, 647 F.2d 73 (C.A. 6, 1981); Kersh et al. v. General Council of the Assemblies
of God, No. C-81-2734 (N.D. Calif. Mar. 11, 1982); see also 12 C.F.R. §218.108, 218.111, 218.113
and 218.114.
[55] See, e.g., Investment Company Institute Asks FDIC to Halt Bank's Mutual Fund, 14 See.
Reg. & L. Rep. 656 (April 16, 1982); Bank's Entry Into Mutual Fund Field Opposed, Legal Times,
April 19, 1982, at 4; Bid By Boston Savings Bank to Run Funds Under Attack From IC1, Securities
Week, April 19, 1982, at 4; SEC "Freezes' Ranking Bids for Money Funds, American Banker, July
8, 1982 at 1. Mr. Pitt is counsel to entities interested in issues presented by these actions.
[56] FDIC News Release PR-72-82, 47 Fed. Reg. 38,984 (Sept. 1, 1982). See FDIC Approves,
Delays GlassSteagall Statement, Legal Times, August 30, 1982, at 1.
[57] See note 55, supra.
[58] 15 U.S.C. §77h(a).
[59] See Letter from George Fitzsimmons, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, to
Hon. William M. Isaac, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, July 16, 1982.
[60] Id.
161] Id.; see also, eg., SEC 'Freezes' Banking Bids for Money Funds, American Banker, July 8,
1982 at 1; Securities Activities Cleared, Legal Times, September 6, 1982, at 9; FDIC to Consider
SEC Request for Glass-SteagallAdvice, Securities Week, August 23, 1982, at 5.
[62] See, e.g., SEC Reconsiders Delay on Bank-Related Money Funds; Original Decision Had
Angered Confused Registrants, American Banker, September 1, 1982, at 1; SEC Lifts Freeze on
Filings for Bank-Tied Money Funds, American Banker, September 2, 1982, at 1.
[63] Id.
[64] 15 U.S.C. §80a-17.
[65] 15 U.S.C. §80a-6(c).
[66] 15 U.S.C. §80a-12(d) (3).
[67] 15 U.S.C. §80a-17(d).
[68] See, e.g., Testimony of Hon. John S. R. Shad, Financial Institutions Restructuring and
Services Act of 1981, Hearings Before the Senate Comnittee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
Part II, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 884 (1981).
[69] 15 U.S.C. §80a-34(d).
[70] 12 U.S.C. §§3501 et seq.
[71] 12 C.F.R. §§217.3, 217.7.
[72] P.L. 97-320 (1982).
[73] 12 U.S.C. §3503(c).
[74] 47 Fed. Reg. 56,320 (Dec. 16, 1982).
[75] 12 U.S.C. §1818.
[76] See e.g., Independent Bankers Association v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1168-1169 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Gulf Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 651 F.2d 259,
264 (5th Cir., 1981); First National Bank of Lamarque v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir.,
1980); First National Bank of Eden v. Department of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611, n. 2 (8th Cir.,
1978).
[77] 47 Fed. Reg. 42121 (Sept. 24, 1982).
[78] 4 U.S.C. §57a.
[79] See 41 Fed. Reg. 44361-62 (Oct. 8, 1976); 12 C.F.R. §§227.1, 227.2.
[80] 12 C.F.R. §333.2.
[81] See 15 Fed. Reg. 7730 (Nov. 14, 1950).
[82] See e.g., Checking Accounts With Money Funds, New York Times, May 23, 1982, at 15;
The Banker's Dilemma; To Sweep or Not to Sweep, American Banker, June 9, 1982, at 4; Banks
Linking with 3rd Parties for Money Funds, American Banker, June 14, 1982 at 1; Chase Introduces
Sweep Account With Choice of Money Market Funds, Washington Financial Reports, May 10, 1982,
at A-19.
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[83] See, e.g., Marine Midland Unveils Two Funds, American Banker, June 11, 1982, at 1;
Crocker Creates Own Version of Money Fund, American Banker, April 23, 1982, at 3; Crocker
National Bank To Offer Money Market Fund, Washington Financial Reports, May 3, 1982 at A-14;
Crocker Markets One-Stop Financial Shopping, Taking Aim at Merrill, Securities Week, May 3.
1982, at 3; Detroit Bank Sets Agency Client Money Fund, American Banker, May 13, 1982, at 3;
Lehman Sponsors Private Label MMFS for Marine Midland, Wall Street Letter, June 21. 1982, at
3; Union Planters Offers Checking Account with Money Market Rates, American Banker, July 6,
1982, at 2.
[841 See, e.g., SEC Approves 2 Bank Money Funds, American Banker, March 8, 1982, at I;
SEC Okays Mastercard Funds, But Stalls VISA Bid, Securities Week, March 8, 1982, at 2.
[85] 404 F.Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. New York Stock
Exchange v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
[86] See e.g., Banking Organizations and Money Market Funds - Relationships and Issues,
Banking Expansion Reporter, May 3, 1982, at 1; Money Market Fund Adviser Qualifies for
Intrastate Registration Exemption. 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., May 7, 1982, at 806; Banks Linking
With 3d Parties for Money Funds, American Banker, June 14, 1982, at 1.
[87] See, e.g., SEC Approves 2 Bank Money Funds, American Banker; SEC Okays Mastercard
Fund, But Stalls VISA Bid, Securities Week, March 8, 1982, at 2; VISA Launches All-or-Nothing
Drive for Fund, American Banker, May 13, 1982 at 3.
[88] See e.g., Letter from Matthew P. Fink, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute,
to Joel H. Goldberg, Director, Division of Investment Management, January 5, 1982.
[89] See Securities Act Release No. 6415 (July 9, 1982).
[90] 15 U.S.C. §80a-35(a).
[911 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a) (40).
[92] 15 U.S.C. §80a-12(d) (3).
[93] 17 C.F.R. §240.12b-1.
[941 12 U.S.C. §24.
[95] Baker, Watts & Co., v. Saxon 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
[95a] 12 U.S.C. §1843(c) (8).
[96] See United Oklahoma Bancshares Inc., 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 363 (1979); United Bancorp., 64
Fed. Res. Bull. 222 (1978); Stepp, Inc., 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 223 (1978).
[97] See Federal Reserve Board Staff Study, Commercial Bank Private Placement Activities 27
(1977) (Private Placement Study).
[98] Id. at 91 n.10.
[99] First Arabian Corporation, 63, Fed. Res. Bull. 66 (1977).
[100] Private Placement Study supra note 97, at 81.
[101] Id. at 87-89.
[102] Id. at 89.
[103] Id. at 90. See also Miller, The Participation of National Banks in Private Placements of
Corporate Securities, 13 New England L. Rev. 63 (1977); Note, Commercial Bank Private
Placement Activity: Cracking Glass-Steagall, 27 Cath. U. L. Rev. 743 (1978).
[104] [1978-1979 Decisions] CCH Fed. Banking L. Rep. 185,107.
[105] See Letter from the Comproller of Currency, Letter No. 212, July 2, 1981 [1981
Decisions] CCH Fed. Banking L. Rep. q85, 293.
[106] A.G. Becker Incorporated v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 519
F.Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1981).
[107] Id.
[108] A.G. Becker Incorporated o. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 693 F.2d
136 (D.C. Cir. 1982) petition for a writ of certiorari pending.
[109] See e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(economic reality of a repurchase transaction is that of a collateralized or secured borrowing);
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Union Planter National Bank of Memphis v. United States F.2d 115 (6th Cir., 1970) (no "sale" took
place in a repurchase transaction).
[1101 See Securities Act Release No. 6351 (Sept. 25, 1981).
[111] 15 U.S.C. §§77c(a) (2) and 77c(a) (3).
(112] 15 U.S.C. §77ddd(a) (4) (A).
[113] See Investment Company Institute v. Camp, supra note 37.
[114] Securities Act Release No. 6351 (Sept. 25, 1981).
[115] See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18927 (July 30, 1982).
[116] See Retail Repurchase Agreements, Comptroller of the Currency Banking circular No.
157 (May 13, 1981); Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Office of Examinations and Supervision,
Memorandum No. R 51 (May 8, 1981). The FHLLBB's Memorandum was substantially revised
and reissued four months later. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Memorandum R Sa
(September 9, 1981). Thereafter, in October, 1981, the FDIC issued its Policy Statement concern-
ing retail repos. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statement of Policy on Retail
Repurchase Agreements (October 6, 1981).
[117] See Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Circular No. 157.
[118] 47 Fed. Reg. 23140 (May 27, 182) (FHLBB); FDIC Release, August 16, 1982; 47 Fed.
Reg. 37879 (Aug. 27, 1982) (FRB).
[119] See, e.g., Proposed FDIC Rule would Grant New Powers to Banks, Legal Times, August
16, 1982, at 1; Fed. Liberalizes Regulations D, a To Help Banks Compete With MMF's,
Washington Financial Reports, August 30, 1982, at 367.
[120] Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469
(1982); 12 U.S.C. §3503(c) (1).
[1211 12 C.F.R. §§1204, 1220.
[122] 47 Fed. Reg. 56320 (Dec. 16, 1982).
[123] See, eg., Study Outline and Hearings on Securities Activities of Commercial Banks,
Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 99 (1975) at 193. See also Securities and Exchange Commission
Initital Report on Bank Securities Activities, reprinted in Reports on Banks Securities Activities of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, (95th Cong., Ist Sess. at 23-42 (Banks Securities Activities Reports).
[124] See Frankel, I The Regulation of Money Managers 80, 81 (1978).
[125] See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977); New York
Stock Exchange v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975).
[126] See, e.g., SIA Says BankAmerica's Purchase of Schwab not Shown to be Closely Related to
Banking, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., June 4, 1982, at 1009-1010.
[1271 See, e.g., Comptroller Approves L.A. Bank's Plan to Offer Discount Brokerage, Washing-
ton Financial Reports, August 30, 1982, at 378.
[128] See, e.g., Union Planters Wants to Buy Discount Brokerage in Memphis, American Banker,
March 5, 1982 at 1.
[129] See, e.g., Fidelity Group Unit Speeds Banks' Entry into Discount Stock Brokerage, Wall
Street Journal, June 16, 1982, at 12; Federated Forms Discount Brokerage Unit to Serve Banks,
American Banker, May 24, 1982, at 3; California S&L Holding Company to Form Securities
Brokerage Unit, American Banker, Sept. 9, 1982, at 1.
[130] 12 US.C. §24 (Seventh).
[131] Hearings on H.R. 5357 Before The House Committee on Banking and Currency, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1935).
[132] Hearings on H.R. 7852 and 8720 Before the House Committee On Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 86 (1934).
[133] See 1 Bulletin of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 2 (October 26, 1936) at 2-3.
[134] Comptroller of the Currency, Digest of Opinions, 220 (1948).
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[135] See, Comptroller of the Currency, Digest of Opinions, 1220A (1957).
[136] See, e.g., Bank Automatic Investment Services [1973-1974 Decisions] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 179,817.
[137] Letter from Comptroller James E. Smith to G. Duane Vieth. June 10, 1974.
[1381 Id.
[1391 See e.g., Luse and Olsen, Glass-Steagall does not bar banks as brokers, Legal Times, May
10, 1982, at 18.
[140] 329 U.S. at 445 n.3.
[1411 450 US. at 63 (emphasis supplied).
[142] 329 U.S. at 447-449.
[143] Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application by Security Pacific
National Bank to Establish an Operating Subsidiary to be known as Security Pacific Discount
Brokerage Services, Inc., August 26, 1982.
[144] 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. CIr. 1975).
[1451 Id.
[146] 12 U.S.C. §1843(c) (8).
[1471 Bank America Corp., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. (January 7, 1983).
[147a] See Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(C.A. 2, No. 83-4019, Petition filed March 16, 1983).
[1481 See 15 U.S.C. §7804.
[1491 See 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 125,944.
[ 150] See Industrial Development Bonds, Owen Carney, Comptroller of the Currency Office (avail.
July 11, 1982); see also Comptroller's Office Advised on Bank Participation in 1DB Private
Placement, Washington Financial Reports, July 26, 1982, at 149-150.
[1511 See J.P. Morgan & Co., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 514 (1982); Bankers Trust Company. 68 Fed.
Res. Bull. 651 (1982); Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 776 (1982).
[1521 See J.P. Morgan & Co., supra note 151.
[153] 47 Fed. Reg. 30872 (July 15, 1982).
[154] See Futures Commission Merchant Decision is Limited, Banking Expansion Reporter, July
19, 1982. at 3.
[1551 450 U.S. at 55.
[156] 450 U.S. at 52 n.l .
[1571 12 C.F.R. §224.125.
[1581 P.L. No. 95-369 (1978).
[1591 12 U.S.C. §3106.
[1601 Id.
[161] See, e.g., Legal Opinion by Thomas P. Vartanian, General Counsel, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, May 6, 1982.
[1621 See 47 Fed. Reg. 9855 (March 8. 1982).
[163] Letter from Thomas P. Vartanian, General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, to
Rep. John E. Dingell, May 26, 1982 (reprinted in Vartanian's Argument for Service Corporation
Regs), Legal Times, June 7, 1982, at 27-28.
[ 164] See, e.g., Comments of the Investment Company Institute submitted to the FHLBB, May
3, 1982.
[165] Id.
[166] See House Committee on Banking and Currency, Housing Act of 1964, H.R. Rep. No.
1703, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964).
[1671 12 U.S.C. §§1861-1865.
[1681 Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982).
[169] 12 U.S.C. Section 1861(b). See Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Bank Service
Corporation Act, S. Rep. No. 2015, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962); see also Senate Committee on
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Banking and Currency, Housing Act of 1964, S. Rep. No. 1265, 88th Congr., 2nd Sess. at 55 (1964).
[170] See Letter from Thomas P. Vartanian to Rep. John D. Dingell, supra:
First, in that case, the Supreme Court stated that section 21 applies only to banks and not to bank
holding companies [citations omitted]. Secondly, the Supreme Court also took a narrow view of the
scope of section 21 ... Because federal S&L service corporations "do not receive deposits," and
because they must be maintained as "separate organizations" (i.e., legally distinct corporations)
from their parent S&L's by regulation, 12 C.F.R. §§563.37, 570.10, it would appear that language
of section 21 should not be read to apply to such corporations, nowithstanding the fact that they
are "related by ownership with [an S&L] which does receive deposits."
[171] See Comments of the Investment Company Institute, supra note 164. Amendments made
to the service corporation provisions by the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act in 1980
increased from I to 3% of an S&L's assets the amount of funds that an S&L was permitted to
invest in a service corporation, and authorized S&L's to invest in share of mutual funds.
[172] See, e.g., Letter from Rep. John D. Dingell to Hon. Richard T. Pratt, Chairman, FHLBB,
February 22, 1982: "What you propose to do is patently illegal under both the Glass-Steagall Act
[citation omitted], and the various statutes creating and defining the role of federal S&Ls."
[173] See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 899, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982).
[174] Id.
[1751 47 Fed. Reg. 49663 (Nov. 2, 1982).





[180] See Statement by R.T. McNamar, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, May 7, 1982.
[181] See Securities Industry Association v. FHLBB (D.D.C., No. 82-1920, Complaint filed July
12, 1982).
[182] 15 U.S.C. §78o(a) (1).
[183] See Letter from SAIS Counsel to SEC Staff, January 12, 1982.
[184] See S&L's Fear SEC Registration could Scuttle Plans for Brokerage, Securities Week, June
7, 1982, at 1.
[185] See Letter from Donald L. Crawford to Douglas Scarff, June 16, 1982.
[186] See Savings Association Investment Securities, Inc., (avail. July 8, 1982. See also SEC
Issues No-Action Position to S&Ls Using Service Subsidiaries Broker, 14 Securities Reg. & L. Rep.,
July 16, 1982, at 1306.
[187] See SEC Halts Home Federal Plan to Offer Discount Brokerage, Washington Financial
Reports, August 30, 1982, at 377.
[188] Home Federal Savings and Loan Association (avail. Sept. 24, 1982); see also Home Federal
Wins SEC Approval to Offer Discout Brokerage Service, Washington Financial Reports, October 4,
1982, at 559.
[189] Report of the Staff of the Division of Investment Management of the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the Regulation of Money Market Funds, May 13, 1981, reprinted in
Competition and Conditions in the Financial System: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Part II, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 978 (1981).
[190] Id.
[191] See, e.g., Testimony of David Silver, President, Investment Company Institute, Competi-
tion and Conditions in the Financial System: Hearings Before the Senate Committtee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Part II, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1177 (1981).
[192] Letter dated December 18, 1979, from Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General,
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Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, to Martin Lybecker, Associate Director.
Division of Investment Management, United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
[193] Letter dated April 30, 1982, from D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, to David Silver, President, Investment Company Institute.
[194] See, e.g., Arieff, Merrill Lynch Bullishly Promotes Licensing Deal, Legal Times, Sept. 13,
1982. at 4; Mayer, Merrill Lynch Quacks Like a Bank, Fortune, Oct. 20, 1980, at 134.
[ 195] The five states that allow some degree of interstate banking are: Delaware, 63 Del. Laws,
ch. 2 803 (Feb. 18, 1981); South Dakota, S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§51-16-40, -41 (1980); Maine,
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. title 9-B, §1013(2) (1980); Iowa, Ia. Code Ann. 524-1805; Alaska, Alaska Stat.
§06.050235(e) (1982); and New York, 1982 New York Laws, Chap. 417 (enacted July 29. 1982).
(196] 12 U.S.C. §36(f).
[1971 12 C.F.R. §7.7380.
[198] Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application by Security Pacific
National Bank to Establish an Operating Subsidiary To Be Known As Security Pacific Discount
Brokerage Services, Inc., August 26, 1982.
[199] Mayer, supra note 194.
[200] Schroeder, Merrill, Fidelity will Sell All-Savers Offered by Thrifts; Plans May Be Trend of
Cooperative Marketing, American Banker, Sept. 1, 1981; Schroeder, DIDC Agrees to Broker-Bank
Link to Market All-Savers; Some Firms Are Already Offering the Certificates, American Banker.
Oct. 2, 1981; Matthews, Court Upholds Joint Offering of All-Savers. American Banker, Oct. 2.
1981.
[2011 State of Iowa v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., Equity No. CE 16-9079 (D. Iowa, Oct.
1981); Complaint, State of Minnesota v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., (D. Minn., Nov. 9,
1981); Home Federal Savings and Loan Association of the South v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., No. 81-G-1569-S (N.D. Alabama, Oct. 20, 1981).
[202 See, e.g., In a Wall Street First Merrill Selling CDs for Retail Investors, Securities Week,
June 14, 1982, at 1.
[203] See, e.g., Merrill Lynch's Insured CD Approved, Legal Times, November 29, 1982, at I.
[204] Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (avail. Oct. 28. 1982).
[2051 12 U.S.C. §1841(a).
[2061 12 U.S.C. §1841(c).
[207] Shearson Merges Boston Company, American Banker, Sept. 29, 1981. at 2.
[2081 See In Re Fidelity Management Trust Company, Order of Board of the FDIC, December
22, 1980.
[209] Letters from the Federal Reserve Board dated March 11, 1981.
[210] 12 U.S.C. §1813(h).
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